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The Supreme Court ruled in Lawrence v. Texas' that states could not
constitutionally criminalize private oral or anal sex between consenting
adults.' How far does the decision sweep? Is it limited to its facts, with no
broader implications for constitutional law, as the Eleventh Circuit recently
held? 3 Or does Lawrenceentail a massive shift, not only protecting any and
all private sexual activities, but also writing the entire "homosexual
agenda" into the Constitution, as Justice Scalia charged in dissent?4 Both
of these extreme reactions can be logically and responsibly argued from the
majority and concurring opinions delivered by Justices Kennedy5 and
O'Connor,6 respectively. But few constitutional scholars think the
narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct. Its charged
reasoning cannot be limited to the sodomy context alone, but neither does
it entail same-sex marriage.
One cannot interpret or apply Lawrence without situating it in
history-not just the history of judicial review of morals legislation, as
Suzanne Goldberg has done;' or the history of equal protection doctrine,
as Nan Hunter and Pam Karlan have done;8 or the history of privacy rights
litigation, as Larry Tribe has done;9 or the history of the lesbian and gay
social movement, as Miranda Oshige McGowan has done;' ° or the history
of what transpired the night of Lawrence and Garner's arrest, as Dale
Carpenter has done," but also the history of traditionalist and religious

1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. Id. at 578-79.
3. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (1 1th
Cir. 2004).
4. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 562-79 (majority opinion).
6. Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
7. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-BasedJustificationsforLawmaking:Before
andAfter Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004).
8. See generally Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened
Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV.

1447 (2004).
9. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
10. See generally Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence,
and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312 (2004).
11. See generally Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L.
REV.
1464 (2004).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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responses to the lesbian and gay rights movement. What I call the
"traditional family values" (TFV) countermovement created a
constitutional theory that has its origins in the Save Our Children campaign
in Dade County, Florida. Save Our Children synthesized a new kind of
anti-gay politics and energized a vigorous, new identity-based social
movement. The new politics was both aggressively negative, invoking
themes of disgust and contagion, as well as surprisingly positive, realigning Protestants and Catholics, blacks and whites in a new identity
arrayed around marriage and family. The Save Our Children campaign also
was an example of popular constitutionalism, for it offered a vision of the
Constitution that allowed the state to exclude and suppress people
(homosexuals) who flaunted their disgusting practices and threatened to
pollute the body politick. Not all traditionalists subscribed to its tenets, but
almost none disagreed publicly.
This Constitution of (Anti-Homosexual) Disgust and Contagion had a
surprising degree of support within the federal judiciary. Led by the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, prominent Republican jurists
endorsed that Constitution, while others acquiesced in it. During the
Burger Court era (1969-86), federal judges rarely interfered with
traditionalist efforts to censor, imprison, or exclude homosexuals because
of their disgusting conduct and their contagious immorality. The Supreme
Court and the D.C. Circuit interpreted the First Amendment to allow
suppression and censorship of contagious homosexuals, 2 the Due Process
Clause (the home of the right to privacy) to allow the state to make
disgusting homosexual sodomy a crime,13 and the Equal Protection Clause
to allow virtually any state discrimination against contagious homosexuals
or disgusting homosexual sodomites. 4 The Constitution of AntiHomosexual Disgust and Contagion was one that tolerated or encouraged
the closet as a condition for homosexual citizenship in this country.
Ironically, it fell to the Rehnquist Court to set constitutional limits on this
body politics, in large part for pragmatic reasons appealing to Republican
centrists. The Texas sodomy case, 15 as well as the Boston parade case 6 and
the Colorado initiative case,17 represent the Court's affirmation that the
core libertarian, free speech, and equality principles of the Constitution
12. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding censorship of sodomy-soaked
erotica).
13. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the privacy right does not
debar the state from making "homosexual sodomy" a crime).
14. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.) (holding that
homosexuality is a classification the state can deploy to impose a wide array of disabilities).
15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
16. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
17. by
Romer
v. Evans,
517 U.S.Repository,
620 (1996). 2005
Published
UF Law
Scholarship
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apply to lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals and sometimes protect them
against a politics that presents them as people whose disgusting features
represent a contagious threat to others and to society.
But in setting some limits, the Court has by no means rejected the
general idea that the Constitution at least tolerates a body politics that
trades on appeals to disgust and contagion. The continuing legitimacy of
such a politics has serious consequences for women seeking abortions,
people with disabilities, lesbians, gay men, and transgendered people in the
United States. Specifically, body politics helps us understand why the
Supreme Court is and will remain reluctant to recognize new constitutional
rights for these minorities, how the state can continue to justify
discrimination against these minorities, and how traditionalists are winning
new constitutional rights of their own. The ongoing culture conflicts
between traditionalists and these minorities are certain to have
destabilizing effects on constitutional law, creating a passive-aggressive
First Amendment, a privacy right with unstable public-private borders, and
an Equal Protection Clause that protects only occasionally and always
unequally.
I.

SAVE OUR CHILDREN AND ANTI-HOMOSEXUAL BODY

POLITICS, 1977-86

In 1971, the Florida Supreme Court declared the state's crime against
nature law unconstitutional because it was too vaguely worded to give
citizens notice of what was criminal and what was allowable conduct
inside the bedroom.' 8 After anguished backroom debate, the Florida
Legislature in 1974 not only failed to enact a law defining more
specifically what was entailed in the crime against nature, but also repealed
the old law.' 9 Although the judicial and legislative actions left in place a
law making "unnatural and lascivious act[s]" a misdemeanor, 0 gay rights
groups read these developments as an encouraging signal. After being
witch-hunted by the state in the 1950s and ignored by law reform
commissions in the 1960s, openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual people were
more numerous than ever in Florida's cities, especially Miami and other
cities in Dade County.
Once a sleepy southern state, by 1970 Florida had become a
multicultural state of almost 6.8 million, and it grew by another three

18. Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971).
19. 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 121, 371-72 (repealing present Chapters 794 and 800, Florida
Statutes, except sections 794.05, 800.03, and 800.04, and creating Chapter 794, Florida Statutes).
20. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (2005); Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1975) (finding
that the unnatural and lascivious conduct law, applied to consensual oral sex, was not void for
vagueness).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
4

Eskridge: Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust
DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

1015

million during the 1970s. 2 Much of the in-migration came to Miami,
Miami Beach, and their suburbs.22 Flocking to a climate that was sunny,
hot, and humid all year long were anti-Castro Cuban refugees, Jewish
retirees from the Northeast, and homosexuals. Miami and South Beach had
long been homosexual havens, and by the 1970s gay culture was out in the
open and increasingly politicized. The founder of Club Baths, a national
chain of gay bath-houses, Jack Campbell worked with activists such as
Bob Basker to create the Dade County Coalition for the Humanistic Rights
of Gays at his Coconut Grove bachelor's pad in the summer of 1976.23 In
the November elections, Campbell's group helped elect a majority of the
Metro-Dade County Commission which governs the Miami metropolitan
area. One of their candidates, Ruth Shack, a school board administrator
who had worked in the civil and women's rights movements, agreed to
introduce a bill to prohibit employment discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation. County and municipal employers would no longer
refuse to hire lesbian, gay, or bisexual people as firefighters, secretaries,
or even police officers.25
Or as schoolteachers. This bothered Anita Bryant, who lived in an
opulent thirty-three room mansion on Biscayne Bay in Miami with her
husband Bob Green and their four vigorously scrubbed children. Bryant
was a former Miss Oklahoma whose trademark rendition of "Battle Hymn
of the Republic" entertained thousands of American troops in Vietnam,
President Johnson and his guests at several White House functions, and the
mourners at Johnson's funeral. The auburn-haired beauty had, since 1968,
enjoyed great fortune, as well as fame, as the spokesperson for the Florida
Citrus Commission ("'A day without orange juice is like a day without
sunshine."'). A Baptist who had accepted Jesus Christ as her Savior at age
eight, Bryant mixed religious disapproval of unnatural relations with some
nutty views about homosexuals. Certain that God disapproved of "known
homosexuals teaching my children," Bryant called Ruth Shack, whom she
had helped elect because Ruth's husband, Dick, was her booking agent. "I
expressed the valid fears we now felt of widespread militant homosexuals'
efforts to influence children to their abnormal way of life." Shack told
Bryant these fears were unfounded.26
21.

POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FLORIDA: POPULATION OF COUNTIES

BY DECENNIAL CENSUS: 1900-1990, http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/fl 190090.txt (last
visited Aug. 14, 2005).
22. Id.
23.

JAMES T. SEARS, REBELS, RUBYFRUIT, AND RHINESTONES: QUEERING SPACE IN THE

STONEWALL SOUTH 229-33 (2001); DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD:
THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 293-94 (1999).
24. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 23, at 294-95.

25. Id. at 295.
26. byANITA
BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY:
Published
UF Law
Scholarship Repository, 2005
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After a prayerful night, Bryant wrote a letter to each commissioner
arguing that the antidiscrimination ordinance would not only violate God's
biblical commandments, but also would
be infringing upon my rights and discriminating against me as
a citizen and a mother to teach my children and set
examples . . . of God's moral code as stated in the Holy

Scriptures. Also, you would be discriminating against my
children's right to grow up in a healthy, decent community.
Bryant made the same argument at the public hearing on January 18, 1977.
Joining her were prominent Baptist preachers, a representative of the
Catholic Archdiocese, and a leading orthodox rabbi. These witnesses
probably swayed a vote or two, but the Commission still voted five-tothree for the ordinance. Bryant was "aflame with indignation" that God's
Word had been disregarded. On the spot, she and other citizens vowed to
overturn the Commission's action.28
Like the charters of many other states, cities, and counties, Dade
County's charter provides that a law can be revoked if enough citizens
petition for a referendum and a majority of voters reject the law in the next
election.29 Bryant easily found more than enough people to sign their
names on her petition. She devoted the next four months to a campaign
called Save Our Children. Its premise was that the law should not give
special rights to people who adhere to homosexuality (a lifestyle that is
"'immoral and against God's wishes'), especially teachers charged with
children's education.3" "[P]ublic approval of admitted homosexual teachers
could encourage more homosexuality by inducing pupils into looking upon
it as an acceptable life-style."3 The debate was not one of gay rights versus
discrimination, but of gay rights versus parents' and children's rights. This
platform brought an unprecedented coalition of religious leaders under one
political tent: Southern Baptist pastors, the Catholic Archbishop ofMiami,
and Orthodox Jewish rabbis all endorsed the referendum and touted it from
their pulpits.32 Governor Reubin Askew, a moderate Democrat, endorsed

AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY 13-15 (1977) (relaying Bryant's shock when the

antidiscrimination law was proposed, and her conversation with Shack); SEARS, supra note 23, at
234 (relaying Shack's account of her conversation with Bryant).
27. BRYANT, supra note 26, at 16.
28. Id. at 22-27; SEARS, supra note 23, at 233-36.
29. Home Rule Amendment and Charter, Miami-Dade County, Florida (Mar. 9,2004), 30-32,
http://www.miamidade.gov/charter/library/04-09-03-charter.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2005).
30. Joe Baker, Anita... with the Smiling Cheek, ADVOCATE, Apr. 20, 1977, at 6; BRYANT,
supra note 26, at 41, 47.
31. BRYANT, supra note 26, at 114.
32. Id. at 22-25, 121-24.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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the effort. "I would not want a known homosexual teaching my children,"
he said.33
Nonetheless, Save Our Children's professional organizers realized,
through their private polling, that most Dade County voters (especially
women) supported the ordinance. Their campaign responded with charges
that homosexuals are not just icky role models, but are aggressive and
predatory. In a Miami Heraldadvertisement that ran on March 20, 1977,
Save Our Children set forth the major themes of its campaign:
"Homosexuality is nothing new. Cultures throughout history, moreover,
have dealt with homosexuals almost universally with disdain, abhorance
[sic], disgust-even death." The advertisement continued: "This
recruitment of our children is absolutely necessary for the survival and
growth of homosexuality-for since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they
must freshen their ranks."34 In the final weeks before the vote, Reverend
Jerry Falwell addressed thousands of voters and their families at a Miami
Convention Center rally: "'So-called gay folks [would] just as soon kill
you as look at you.""' The day before the vote, the Miami Heraldran an
advertisement that read: "The Other Side of the Homosexual Coin is a
Hair-Raising Pattern of Recruitment and Outright Seduction and
Molestation. 3 6 These fantastic claims preyed on mothers' concerns for
their children, as well as men's anti-homosexual prejudices. Most extreme
was Bryant's press release, "Why Certain Sexual Deviations Are
Punishable by Death." Fearing God's imminent judgment, Bryant
commented that "these vile beastly creatures" were engaging in "frantic
efforts" to achieve public acceptance and were thereby draging the whole
community down with them-just like Sodom and Gomorrah!37
Underfunded and politically inexperienced, the Coalition conducted an
ineffective campaign. Its leaders underestimated the power of Bryant's
gay-bashing stars and, more important, failed to mobilize grass-roots
opposition.38 On June 7, 1977, Dade County voters revoked the
antidiscrimination ordinance by more than a two-to-one margin. 39 A day
after the vote, the Florida legislature barred homosexuals from adopting

33. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 23, at 301 (quoting Governor Askew).
34. Kill a Queerfor Christ, ADVOCATE, June 1, 1977, at 6 (quoting Save Our Children's

March 20, 1977 advertisement and asking for donations to help oppose the referendum).
35. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 23, at 306.
36. There Is No "HumanRight "to CorruptOurChildren, MIAMI HERALD, June 6, 1977, at
7B (advertisement) [hereinafter MIAMI HERALD Advertisement], quoted in CLENDINEN &
NAGOURNEY, supra note 23, at 304.
37. PERRY DEANE YOUNG, GOD'S BULLIES: NATIVE REFLECTIONS ON PREACHERS AND

POLmCS 44 (1982).
38. See SEARS, supra note 23, at 236-45 (offering a critical account of the campaign in
defense of the antidiscrimination law).
note 26,Repository,
at 125.
39.byBRYANT,
Published
UF Lawsupra
Scholarship
2005
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children.4" Fueled by her Florida success, Bryant announced that her allies
would "carry our fight against similar laws throughout the nation that
attempt to legitimize a lifestyle that is both perverse and dangerous to the
sanctity of the family, dangerous to our children, dangerous to our freedom
of religion and freedom of choice, dangerous to our survival as one nation,
under God."' True to her word, Bryant traveled from locale to locale
preaching against antidiscrimination laws.42 Wichita, Kansas, St. Paul,
Minnesota, and Eugene, Oregon, immediately followed Dade County in
repealing their gay rights ordinances by referenda.43
In 1978, California state Senator John Briggs, who had been part of
Save Our Children's campaign, took Bryant's idea one step further. His
organization, California Defend Our Children, placed on the state ballot an
initiative to disqualify from public school employment anyone engaged in
"advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting private or
public homosexual activity directed at, or likely to come to the attention
' Rather than repeal a gay
of school children and/or other employees."44
rights law, the Briggs Initiative sought to reaffirm traditional state
discriminations against lesbian and gay teachers that had been substantially
nullified by the California Supreme Court.45 The initiative also would have
encoded the preservationist message of Save Our Children: Open
homosexuality, per se, is a threat to children because its appeal is as
alluring as its practice is ruinous. Rhetorically, Briggs followed the Dade
County script, depicting homosexuals as disgusting people and predatory
child molesters. One pamphlet distributed by his campaign pictured a boy
lying in a pool of blood, with this caption: "'You can act right now to help
protect your family from vicious killers and defend your children from
homosexual teachers. ,,46
Briggs made explicit, more than anyone before him, the connection
among "unnatural relations" (sodomy); "dishonorable passions"
(homosexuality); and immoral hedonistic ideology (Gay is Good,
Hedonism is All, etc.). He also went further than Bryant in naming the
culprits in America's moral pollution. According to Briggs, it was not only
homosexual schoolteachers who polluted public culture, but also their
straight allies. The homosexual-heterosexual, as well as the public-private,
40. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 140 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3)).
41. See BRYANT, supra note 26, at 131.
42. Id. at 131-38.
43. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA.L. REV. 1695, 1703 (1993). For
a discussion on the unusual success of antigay referenda between 1974 and 1993, see Barbara S.
Gamble, PuttingCivil Rights to a PopularVote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245 (1997).
44. CLENDINEN&NAGOURNEY, supra note 23, at 377-79, 381.
45. See Bd. of Educ. v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1977) (barring school boards from
dismissing gay teachers without proof of conduct inappropriate to the job).
46. CLENDNEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 23, at 381 (quoting Briggs's pamphlets).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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line completely disappeared in Briggs's Initiative: Straight teachers who
"'encourag[e] or promot[e]"' private homosexual activity must be
discharged if such activity is "'likely to come to the attention of []
schoolchildren."' 47 This was the initiative's Achilles Heel, for it threatened
to embroil schools in ongoing disputes and litigation over teachers'
statements on this sensitive subject. Former Governor Reagan opposed the
measure for this reason, and his declared opposition turned an apparent
vote for the Briggs Initiative into a rout against it in November 1978.48
Although the Briggs Initiative failed and Bryant's own star faded, a
new TFV movement already had formed organizations and personal
networks that enabled the traditionalist perspective to be heard in the
public culture, to raise money for friends and against enemies, and to affect
politics at every level of government. The structure of an organized
constellation of anti-gay organizations was in place by the summer of
1977, including the Survival of a Free Congress, The Conservative Caucus,
and, of course, Save Our Children.49 The emerging king of direct-mail
fundraising, Richard Viguerie, helped coordinate these groups and was
channeling them to support Ronald Reagan's third run for the presidency
in 1980.50 The anti-gay network only diversified and grew. New groups
included the National Conservative Political Action Committee, run by
Terry Dolan; the Christian Voice and the Religious Roundtable;
Congressman John Ashbrook's American Conservative Union; and the
Moral Majority, founded by Reverend Falwell in 1979. 5' These groups
contributed, perhaps significantly, to Reagan's election in 1980. The
Christian Voice paid for television advertisements in the Midwest and
South that portrayed images of "militant homosexuals," with this
admonition: "Carter advocates acceptance of homosexuality. Ronald
Reagan stands for the traditional American family."52 The Moral Majority
deployed messages such as this to register and bring millions of
fundamentalists to the polls, most of whom voted for Reagan.53 Reagan's
large majority resulted from his ability to make great inroads into
traditionally Democratic Baptists in the South and Catholics in big
cities-precisely the voters targeted by the Christian Right.'
47. Hunter, supra note 43, at 1703 (quoting Cal. Proposition 6, § 3(b)(2) (1978)). For a
discussion of the novel discourse of the Briggs Initiative, see id. at 1703-04. See also Jane S.
Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1993) (discussing the current national debate about extending civil
rights laws to gay men and lesbians).
48. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 23, at 387-88.
49. Sasha Gregory-Lewis, UnravelingtheAnti-gay Network, ADVOCATE, Sept. 7, 1977, at 6.

50. Id.
51. YOUNG, supra note 37, at 88-103.
52. Id. at 104.

53.

JERRY FALWELL, STRENGTH FOR THE JOURNEY

365

(1987).

Evangelicalsas a PoliticalForce:Reagan and
L. Brudney
& Gary
W. Copeland,
54. byJeffrey
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II. BODY POLITICS: DISGUST AND CONTAGION AS POTENT
POLITICAL TROPES

Anita Bryant's campaign changed people's minds about rights for gay
people, and in my opinion revolutionized American politics. It did so
through a body politics, which localized discrimination against a group of
Americans by reference to their natures and the dangers of contagion
posed by unnatural acts, people, and ideologies. As Victoria Nourse
argues, such a body politics has been a staple in United States history.55
Similar, or cognate, claims were made by our English ancestors as reasons
to exterminate Native Americans, enslave Africans, marginalize and even
demonize Roman Catholics, discriminate against Italian and Irish
immigrants, purge Jews from civic life, engage in a massive federal
Kulturkampf against the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints,
bar Chinese and other "Mongol races" from immigrating here, detain
Japanese-Americans during World War I, and deny basic state services to
the children of Latino immigrants.56 The politics of the body is an effort to
naturalize inferiority. I agree with Nourse, albeit for theoretical reasons
somewhat different than hers, that such a naturalized discourse is a
powerful form of politics.
In the account that follows, I want to show how the rhetoric of Save
Our Children appeals to very powerful emotions of disgust and plays upon
strong human desires to maintain and reaffirm boundaries. I shall tie their
rhetoric to an astounding theoretical literature of disgust and contagion,
which helps explain the power of this rhetoric to persuade. Not irrelevant
was the ability of Bryant and her allies to tie their rhetoric to sacred texts,
namely, the Torah and the New Testament. This not only heightened the
appeal of body politics to Jewish and Christian fundamentalists, but also
suggested that the campaign was not just appealing to people's prejudices.
There was a historical and normative depth to Save Our Children that Club
Baths could not match.

the 1980 Religious Vote, 65 Soc. SCI. Q. 1072, 1072-79 (1984).
55. Victoria Nourse, In Evil on Reckless Hands: Science Crime and Constitution in
Depression and War-The History of Skinner v. Oklahoma (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (setting forth, with breathtaking historical depth, the ways in which naturalized
political tropes play out in race and sexual orientation settings).
56. See, e.g., LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA (1994) (describing
prejudice against Jews as having been justified by their alleged sexual improprieties); Orma
Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 543 (1964);
Ronald J. Ross, Enforcing the Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and the Limits of Coercion
in Imperial Germany, 56 J.MOD. HIST. 456 (1984).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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A. Disgust and Homosexual Acts
A central claim of Bryant's campaign was to remind voters that
homosexuals did disgusting things, a claim verified by the Bible. The most
dramatic was her pamphlet, "Why Certain Sexual Deviations Are
Punishable by Death."5 7 The reference was to Leviticus 20:13, which
states, "If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have
committed an abomination [to the Lord]; they shall be put to death, their
blood is upon them. 5 8 Chapter 20 mainly concerns rules of incest and also
renders intercourse with animals a capital offense. If either a man (20:15)
or a woman (20:16) lies with a beast, not only must the human be
executed, but so too the beast, for "their blood is upon them. ' 59 For
Christians, Romans 1:24-32 picks up this theme that crimes of the body are
the worst. Romans, St. Paul charged, were "dishonoring ...their bodies
among themselves," which is the worst of sins against God. 60 He then
condemns women who "exchanged natural relations for unnatural," and
the men who "gave up natural relations with women and were consumed
with passion for one another.",6 ' The precise activities being condemned
are not named, but the men and women who commit them are subjected
to a litany of Pauline calumnies stretching across several verses: "Full of
envy, murder, strife, deceit, malignity, they are gossips, slanderers, haters
of God, insolent, haughty, boastful, inventors of evil, disobedient to
parents, foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless. 6 2
From that Biblical foundation, Anita Bryantjustified all kinds of wacky
statements and beliefs about homosexuals, whom she referred to, in
writing, as "vile beastly creatures. 6 3 In 1978, she reportedly told an
interviewer that "homosexuals are called fruits" because they "eat the

57. See YOUNG, supra note 37, at 44.
58. Leviticus 20:13 (Revised Standard Version) (1952). All Bible quotations are from the

Revised Standard Version (1952), the Bible I was given when I was confirmed into the Presbyterian
Church in 1962. Other versions of the Bible will offer somewhat different terminology, but nothing
about my argument depends upon such terminology.
59. Leviticus 20:15-16.
60. Romans 1:24-25.
61. Romans 1:26-27.

62. Romans 1:29-31. There is a large critical literature on Romans 1:24-32. For a detailed
debate, compare Mark D. Smith, Ancient Bisexuality and the Interpretationof Romans 1:26-27,
64 J. AM. AcAD. RELIGION 223 (1996) (representing a traditionalist reading), with Daniel A.
Helminiak, Ethics, Biblical and Denominational:A Response to Mark Smith, 65 J.AM. ACAD.
RELIGION 855 (1997), and Dale B. Martin, Heterosexismandthe InterpretationofRomans 1:18-32,

3 BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 332 (1995) (representing gay-friendly readings). For the best historical
treatment, see BERNADETTE J. BROOTEN, LOvE BETWEEN WOMEN: EARLY CHRISTIAN RESPONSES
TO FEMALE HOMOEROTICISM (1996).
63. by
YOUNG,
supra
note 37, atRepository,
44.
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forbidden fruit of the tree of life," namely sperm. 64 In 1977, Bryant could
not bring herself even to mention the sex acts performed by homosexuals,
but she could assume that her audience shared her revulsion at the insertion
of penises and tongues in places where they did not belong (i.e., mouths
and anuses). It remains unclear exactly what she and her allies said in
public appearances, for she believes she was frequently misquoted. The
only example of misattribution mentioned in her autobiography is this: The
media quoted her as saying that homosexuals were "garbage." Instead, "I
said, 'If [children] are exposed to homosexuality, I might as well feed them
garbage."' 65 If anything, what Bryant says she said was an even more
powerful appeal to a politics of the body. She had already dismissed
homosexuals as "beastly," their own bodies polluted; and her new charge
was that even "expos[ing]" children to homosexuals was like "feed[ing]
them garbage," namely polluting children's innocent bodies with the filth
of homosexuality.66 These and other tropes reflect a central feature of body
politics-its open appeal to feelings of disgust among the audience. Such
appeals have a unique power.
Social psychologists have demonstrated that human judgment is
strongly influenced by cognitive stereotypes and emotional prejudices that
are resistant to rational analyses and argumentation.67 "[S]ocial
intuitionist" thinkers say that "moral judgment is caused by quick moral
intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral
reasoning.,68 Jonathan Haidt, the leading conceptualizer, has found that
sexual taboos are particularly susceptible to disgust-driven rather than
harm-driven moral reactions.69 In laboratory experiments, self-identified
liberals (whose moral metric is the harm principle) and conservatives
(whose moral metric is tradition) had almost the same level of negative
reaction to scenarios involving incest and masturbation. The subjects' post
hoc justifications differed dramatically, but their bottom-line moral

64. Bryant's Boyfriend Tells All, ADVOCATE, May 3, 1978, at 7.
65. BRYANT, supra note 26, at 27.
66. See id.; YOUNG, supra note 37, at 44.
67. See generally Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt,
Emotional Dog]; Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and
Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (2001) [hereinafter
Haidt, Sexual Morality]; Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (andWhere) Does MoralJudgment

Work?, 6 TRENDS INCOGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2002) (providing a neutral basis for the social intuitionist
theory of how we form moral judgments). We first learned of this literature from Courtney Megan
Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage,Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical
Perspective on ContemporaryFamily Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543
(2005).
68. Haidt, Emotional Dog,supra note 67, at 817.
69. Haidt, Sexual Morality, supra note 67, at 191.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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judgments were very similar. Interestingly, there was the greatest variation
between liberal and conservative subjects as to disapproval of consensual
gay sex, suggesting a strong correlation between conservative attitudes and
disgust toward homosexual intercourse."v
Paul Rozin maintains that our most primordial disgust responses arise
out of emotional efforts to humanize our animal bodies and distance
ourselves from physical functions that are "reminders of our animal
vulnerability."'" Like prejudices, feelings of disgust are nonrational
responses to physical phenomena, yet they may be underlying motivations
for our rational discourses. Sexuality is an obvious situs for disgust.
Almost anything related to sex is disgusting to some people; some sexual
practices are disgusting to almost all people; and almost all people feel
their disgust intensely. Although most people engage in oral sex, and many
in anal sex, a lot of Americans find these activities disgusting. Anal sex is
particularly disgusting because the anus is a gateway to one of the body's
most private areas and its function is to expel and not to receive. The
anus's unseemly appearance and odor only serve to deepen its unique
potential to disgust most Americans.72 Because male homosexuality (and,
quite irrationally, female homosexuality as well) is deeply associated with
anal sex, it has long been disgusting to Americans. And their disgustdriven view that homosexual sex is immoral has persisted (even if at
reduced levels) as the majority view during the twentieth century.73
B. Boundary Maintenanceand Homosexual Contagion
Save Our Children would not have been as successful as it was if
Bryant had just focused on the disgusting features of homosexuality.
Bryant's key move was to recall and invoke tropes of homosexual
predation: Because homosexuals cannot reproduce, they recruit-your
children. "' Some of the stories I could tell you of child recruitment and
child abuse by homosexuals would turn your stomach,"' she warned.7 4 In
the 1950s and 1960s, the Florida Legislative Investigation Commission,
nicknamed the "Johns Commission" after its chair, had engaged in witch-

70. Id. at 213-16.
71. Paul Rozin, Jonathan Haidt, & Clark R. McCauley, Disgust,in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS
637, 642 (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2000); see also MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 89 (2004) (drawing from
Rozin's work and exploring the way disgust emotions "polic[e] the boundary between ourselves
and nonhuman animals, or our own animality").
72. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 98-101 (1997).
73. See, e.g., AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, ATrrUDES ABOuT HOMOSEXUAIYrY & GAY

MARRIAGE 2-3 (2004) (updated May 20, 2005) (compiled by Karlyn Bowman), available at
http://www.aei.org/publication 14882.
74. by
CLENDNEN
& NAGOURNEY,
supra note2005
23, at 303.
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hunts designed to uncover and purge closeted homosexuals from the public
school, college, and university system.75 Its final report, issued in a
paperback with an erotic adolescent male pictured on the purple cover,
declared a state of sexual emergency in Florida to stave off "homosexual
recruiting of youth." To accomplish this, "the closet door must be thrown
open and the light of public understanding cast upon homosexuality. 76
Neither the Commission's state of sexual emergency nor Bryant's
campaign depended entirely on the myth of the recruiting homosexual,
however. For both, the mere presence of the homosexual represents a
temptation to youth. Homosexuality itself always risks contagion, and
contagion spells doom. The contagious diseased things, not really "human
beings," must be purged.
The Briggs Initiative pressed Bryant's idea toward the notion that even
tolerance of, or neutral reference to, homosexuality is dangerous because
it sends the wrong message to youth. 77 "A teacher who is a known
homosexual will automatically represent that way of life to young,
impressionable students at a time when they are struggling with their own
critical choice of sexual orientation," Briggs warned. "When children are
constantly exposed to such homosexual role models, they may well be
inclined to experiment with a life-style that could lead to disaster for
themselves and, ultimately, for society as a whole.,

78

A deep reason

homosexuality is alluring to immature youth is that it represents the
pleasure principle in its most naked form: Oral or anal sex cannot be
procreative, and therefore not marital either, and its only justification is
pleasure. Short-term pleasure sounds great to immature teenagers-indeed,
it all but defines "adolescent" thinking and behavior-but traditionalists
say adults know that pleasure is fleeting and cannot be the basis for the
larger purposes God has for us. Once you are addicted to homosexuality,
as the immature adolescent might be, notwithstanding his parents' best
efforts, it is hard to return to the straight and narrow. And once some youth
become hooked on homosexuality, it is easier for others to follow the path
Before you know it, "dishonorable passions" dominate
of alluring pleasure.
79
community.
a

75. The Johns Commission is discussed at length in JAMES T. SEARS, LONELY HUNTERS: AN
ORAL HISTORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY SOUTHERN LIFE, 1948-1968, at 48-108 (1997).
76.

FLA. LEGIS. INVESTIGATION COMM'N, HOMOSEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN FLORIDA 14

(1964) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. Of Archives, ser. 1486, carton 1, Tallahassee, Fla.),
discussedin William N. Eskridge, Jr., PrivacyJurisprudenceandtheApartheidofthe Closet, 19461961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 747-50 (1997).
77. John V. Briggs, Deviants Threaten the American Family, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1977,
at VII-5.
78. Id.

79. Romans 1:26.
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As before, there were Scriptural foundations, or at least parallels, for
this kind of thinking. The Old Testament story of Sodom and Gomorrah
is a morality tale that can be understood as God's judgment on the "cities
of the plain," either for homosexual licentiousness that spread through
those cities (a very aggressive reading of Genesis 19:1-29) or attempted
sexual assault by the men of Sodom against the angels visiting Lot's house
(a more widely accepted reading)."0 Either interpretation suggests that the
sexual impropriety of a few can infect an entire community, for Genesis
suggests that the infraction was one that the entire community shared.8 '
Accordingly, God punished them all. St. Paul implicitly reminded the
Romans of the fate of Sodom when he warned them that "the wrath of God
is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men."82
The sins of Sodom seemed to him proliferating among the Romans, and
the whole community was at risk because it did not purge itself of the
"inventors of evil."83 "Though they know God's decree that those who do
such things deserve to die, they not only do them but approve those who
practice them."84 Good Christians and Jews should purge their
communities of these inventors of evil, and at least must turn their back
upon perdition, lest they suffer the fate of Lot's wife.85
In Purity and Danger, anthropologist Mary Douglas helps us
understand how feelings of disgust are related to community fears of
contagion and their cure through purity rituals. Douglas understands
disgust as a matter of pollution. 6 Human beings derive emotional as well
as intellectual security from familiar patterns, many of which we receive
from the surrounding culture. Institutions and practices achieve much of
their normative power by their ability to give us a tidy grid in which to
organize our thinking about an untidy world. We are emotionally
committed not only to our cherished institutions and practices, but also to
the labels they deploy and the lines they draw. So disgust is a reaction to

80. See JOHN J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 42-50 (4th ed. 1993). For
readings that distance the Sodom story from homosexuality, per se, see also DERRICK SHERWIN
BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 1-25 (Archon Books 1975)
(1955); JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE
IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
93 (1980).
81. See MCNEILL, supra note 80, at 43.
82. Romans 1:18.

83. Romans 1:30.
84. Romans 1:32.
85. See Genesis 19:26.
86. MARY DOUGLAs, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND
TABOO (1966). In contrast, Martha Nussbaum situates Douglas's theory as an account of "taboos
and prohibitions," and not "disgust" per se. NUSSBAUM, supra note 71, at 91. Nussbaum prefers

Rozin's theory.
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phenomena and practices that do not fit labels or that cross lines. For
Douglas, disgust is a reaction that serves the role of boundary
maintenance.8 7 She would treat Rozin's theory of disgust as a specific
example of her more general theory. Certain physical phenomena (such as
sodomy) are disgusting to many of us because they threaten the boundaries
between human being and animal; other phenomena are disgusting because
they threaten social boundaries and institutional lines.88
Leviticus illustrates Douglas's theory beautifully. The rules in Chapter
20 not only prohibit sexually disgusting conduct, ranging from adultery
and incest to sodomy and bestiality, but also admonish the People of God
to purge impure people from their community.89 Because of their
inappropriate deployment of body parts, "their blood is upon them" when
members of the community violate the prohibitions.9" Leviticus is filled
with admonitions against the mixing of the pure and the impure, together
with rituals for cleansing impurity. Hence, there are detailed dietary
restrictions in Chapter 11, such as the rule that prohibits the eating of
winged insects that go on all fours9 1 but that allows the eating of locusts or
crickets.92 The most detailed prescriptions relate to leprosy, a disease of the
skin,93 and "discharges" from the body, including semen and menstrual
blood.94 The rules against mixing extend so far that the Israelites were
admonished not to wear "a garment of cloth made of two kinds of stuff."95
Pollution is the mixing of pure and impure things. The worst pollution
occurs under circumstances where the impure will pollute the pure.
This is why Save Our Children was so upset by Dade County's
antidiscrimination ordinance: By protecting homosexuals against
exclusion, it was not only inviting more of them to come to Dade County
and live open and unashamed lives, but it was a civic ritual that was the
opposite of purification. "'If [children] are exposed to homosexuality, I
might as well feed them garbage,"' namely, disgusting stuff. 9 6 This is the
worst kind of pollution, for it not only mixes the impure (homosexuality)
with the pure (children), but it does so under circumstances where

87. DOUGLAS, supra note 86, at 122-24; see also Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics ofAmerican
Law, 115 HARv.L. REV. 1047, 1061-65 (2002) (discussing the law's obsession with classifications
and grids); Cahill, supra note 67, at 1580-81 (applying Douglas's social pollution idea to incest
taboos).
88. DOUGLAS, supra note 86, at 41-57.
89. Leviticus 20.
90. Id.
91. Leviticus 11:20.
92. Leviticus 11:22.
93. Leviticus 13-14.
94. Leviticus 15.
95. Leviticus 19:19.
96. BRYANT, supra note 26, at 27.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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contagion of the latter by the former is inevitable. This was a powerful
message to Dade County parents, particularly mothers.
C. Disgust and Boundary Maintenanceas Constitutive: The Creation
of a New TraditionalistIdentity
William Ian Miller adds an important affirmative dimension to the
analysis: Disgust is constitutive. One's individual identity is, to some
extent, created or molded by one's disgusts. "Our durable self is defined
as much by disgust as by any other passion.... It installs large chunks of
the moral world right at the core of our identity, seamlessly uniting body
and soul and thereby giving an irreducible continuity to our characters."97
And so is the larger community itself. Disgust is "especially useful and
necessary as a builder of moral and social community. It performs this
function obviously by helping define and locate the boundary separating
our group from their group, purity from pollution, the violable from the
inviolable."98
The Levitical rules served three purposes: They showed obedience to
God's commands; assured the Israelites of an unpolluted and therefore
healthy community; and distinguished the Israelites from the impure
peoples they were displacing (and eradicating) in Palestine. Said The Lord:
"You shall therefore keep all my statutes and all my ordinances, and do
them; that the land where I am bringing you to dwell may not vomit you
out."99 Note the close contrast between the purifying rules and the
disgusting consequences of disobeying them. Paul's letter is addressed to
"all God's beloved in Rome, who are called to be saints"1 ° and invites
them to differentiate themselves from the bulk of Romans, whom God
gave up "in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonoring of their
bodies among themselves."' 0'
Like the Israelites and Rome's community of saints, Bryant and her
allies saw themselves as the Chosen of The Lord. What bound them
together as a faith community was their shared disgust against impure
sexual conduct, epitomized by homosexuality. This is an important
phenomenon, for this kind of thinking was recasting the lines of religious

97. MILLER, supra note 72, at 194-95.
98. Id.at 250-51; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96

MICH. L. REv. 1621 (1998) (reviewing Miller's book); Joseph R. Gusfield, On LegislatingMorals:
The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REv. 54 (1968) (discussing

"disinterested indignation" as "one kind of deviance designation" where "hostility [is] directed
against a norm violator despite the absence of direct or personal damage to the norm upholder and
designator").
99. Leviticus 20:22.
100. Romans 1:7.
101. Romans 1:24.
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identity in the United States. Before the 1970s, Americans treated
denominational lines-especially the Catholic-Protestant and ChristianJewish ones-as fraught with enormous moral significance. Once abortion
became legal (1973) and homosexuality a protected classification in Dade
County (1977), traditionalists of all faiths found they had much in
common, rooted in disgust and boundary maintenance. Just as they did in
Save Our Children, conservative Catholics, orthodox Jews, and
fundamentalist Baptists worked together and liked it.
Religious fundamentalists were united by more than a mutual disgust,
however. Disgust also served a positive project: the valorization of
marriage and the family. Although Leviticus nowhere admonishes the
Israelites to marry and procreate, that is the assumption of many of its
rules. Saint Paul is more explicit in his first Letter to the Corinthians. "The
body is not meant for immorality, but for the Lord, and the Lord for the
body."1 °2 This epitomizes body politics, and Paul spends much of the letter
suggesting that the body is best not polluted at all by sexual activities of
any sort. 3 But it is no sin to marry, "[flor it is better to marry than to be
aflame with passion."'0 4 The goal of a Christian marriage is to join as
sexual partners two believers who beget and rear "clean" and "holy"
children.'
Modem fundamentalists such as Anita Bryant have none of Paul's
ambivalence. At least publicly, they are sex-positive, but only within the
context of procreative marriage. This is the traditional Roman Catholic
position, but one that fundamentalist Protestants have also announced as
their own."0 6 Almost any sexual activity is disgusting to most Americans,
especially when other people engage in it, but the presumption of disgust
is rebutted when sexual activities are tied to love, intimacy, marriage, or
family. Among our friends and family, we tolerate habits that we should
label as disgusting if done by strangers. But with our lovers and spouses,
"we understand the disgusting behavior or substance to be a privilege of
intimacy, which would be a grave offense if it were not understood that it
was privileged; this last often involves the intersection of disgust and
sexual pleasure (but need not)."'0 7 For Christians, Saint Paul insists that the

102. 1 Corinthians6:13.
103. 1 Corinthians 7:8 (urging the unmarried and widows "to remain single
Corinthians 7:25-26 (opining that the unmarried should remain as they are, "in
impending distress").
104. 1 Corinthians7:9.
105. 1 Corinthians 7:12-14.
106. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Considerations Regarding
Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons" (June 3, 2003),

as I do"); 1
view of the
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reprintedin

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 511-15 (2d ed.

2004).
107. MILLER, supra note 72, at 132-33.
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blank check for engaging in (disgusting) sexual activities can be cashed
only when the love and intimacy are in the context of a marriage that is (1)
a lifetime commitment, (2) engaged in for procreative purposes, (3)
between spouses who have both accepted the Lord.' 08 Paul's ideal is two
fleshes made one, a merger which sanctifies the otherwise disgusting and
sinful activities of the two sexualized bodies.' 0 9 His was a high standard for
marriage. When Anita Bryant left her husband in 1980, she justified the
break-up of her marriage by her doubts that her husband was a proper
Christian. "0Bryant's leaving her husband and her remarriage several years
later directly violated Paul's admonition: "If any woman has a husband
who is an unbeliever, and he consents to live with her, she should not
divorce him."'
So the new identity created in the 1970s is not simply an anti-gay
identity, based upon the shared belief that homosexuals engage in
disgusting practices, which yield diseased bodies, and represent a
contagious threat to youth. It is also a pro-traditional family values identity.
Americans were anti-gay before 1977, and they favored families too. What
was novel about Save Our Children was its wedding of an anti-gay body
politics of disgust and contagion with a pro-family politics of romance and
religion. To satisfy God's plan and achieve great happiness for yourself
and your children, you must help purge public culture of open
homosexuality and other forms of sexual contagion.
III. THE BURGER COURT ACQUIESCES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF ANTIHOMOSEXUAL DISGUST AND CONTAGION

Although not as well-specified as its moral theory and its body politics,
Save Our Children and the Briggs Amendment also had a constitutional
theory." 2 We the People hold ultimate authority in the United States, and
ordinary Americans, especially parents, understand ours as a civic
community imbued with moral values. Politics is the arena where those
values are debated. Fundamentalist Christians and some orthodox Jews
were confident that their Godly values were intrinsically correct and would
be persuasive to ordinary Americans. Hence, the first proposition of their
Constitution was popular sovereignty, with little or no role for elite
officials. Judges were suspect, for lawyers' culture was strongly secular
and most judges seemed not particularly religious. And thejudges who had
108. 1 Corinthians7:1-7.
109. See 1 Corinthians7:10-16.
110. See ANITA BRYANT, A NEW DAY (1992).
111. 1 Corinthians 7:13.
112. On the constitutional theory of traditional family values groups, see generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law inthe
2062, 2179-92
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delivered Roe v. Wade-abomination itself-seemed tempted to deliver
rights for homosexuals as well. Such officials must be disciplined with
that made legislators pause before
some of the same popular accountability
13
delivering rights to homosexuals."
The second plank of the Save Our Children Constitution was that an
important role of law is to instantiate moral values, both by legislating
against disgusting activities and by protecting vulnerable citizens against
moral pollution as well as predation. Certainly, moral boundarymaintenance is a core role for government, and novel constitutional rights,
(notably, the right to choose abortions) that limit this role cannot
legitimately be created. Hence, homosexuals ought not be able to challenge
sodomy laws that make their disgusting conduct illegal. Because the most
important feature of law is meta-normative---creating the conditions
whereby members of society can flourish and are most likely to make good
choices (e.g., to marry and form loving families)-homosexuals had no
constitutional basis for objecting when the state or private parties treated
them as morally inferior and even contagious. Optimally, from Bryant's
point of view, the legal regime would include an array of mutually
reinforcing statutes reflecting natural law morality and making sure that the
law did not promote homosexuality. Thus, Bryant followed up her Dade
County victory with petitions for the Florida Legislature to reinstate its
sodomy law and to bar homosexuals from adopting children." 4
Bryant's third proposition was that parents and children have civil
rights that are more fundamental than the superficial rights claimed by
feminists, abortionists, and homosexuals. Family-based rights include the
rights of parents to direct the sexuality and control the education of their
children, as well as the rights of children to be free from state-required or
supported pollution. Indeed, there was a broader right all normal
Americans enjoyed: Just as a healthy person has a right not to be exposed
to a diseased person, so a normal American and especially her children
have rights not to be exposed to the contagion of homosexuality." 5
During the period when Warren Burger was Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court (1969-86), this Constitution of Anti-Homosexual Disgust
and Contagion was, by default, the law of the land. The Burger Court never
explicitly adopted this sectarian reading of the Constitution, but it managed
to reject or duck, and never accept, the constitutional claims brought to it
by homosexuals objecting to this Constitution. The nation's leading
Republican jurists-Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and Robert
Bork--explicitly endorsed such a Constitution. The usual explanation for
the Burger Court's anti-gay constitutionalism is that the Justices were
113. Id. at2180-81.
114. Seeid.at2180,2193.
115. See Eskridge, supranote 112, at 2186.
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aggressively homophobic, a charge that is true for the Chief Justice but not
the others (in my opinion). I think the better explanation is that the Justices
were homo-ignorant and believed the legitimacy of the judiciary was at
risk if they trumped anti-gay body politics with constitutional principle.
Unfortunately, the Justices dodged gay rights in the clumsiest possible
ways, and they ended up harming their own institution more than they
harmed homosexuals.
A. Substantive Due Process (Privacy)
The most obvious illustration of my thesis is the Burger Court's
sodomy jurisprudence. In the 1970s, the Court summarily rejected claims
that crime-against-nature statutes violated the clear notice requirement of
the Due Process Clause. The Justices believed that the crime "that dare not
' could describe itself as little as possible in the state
speak its name"116
code, so long as there was some public interpretation that could plausibly
include fellatio, cunnilingus, and other activities that had not traditionally
been included in that crime.' 17 This judicial response was surely embedded
within the kind of body politics explained above: All the cases involved
unmarried straight and gay persons engaging in sexual activities the
Justices considered disgusting and preferred not even to contemplate.
Consistent with its approach to the vagueness challenges, the Burger Court
was not eager to take on gay people's claims that consensual sodomy laws
violated the right of privacy the Court had recognized in its contraception
and abortion cases. Three years after Roe, the Court in Doe v.
Commonwealth'sA ttorneyforRichmond summarily affirmed a lower court
decision upholding Virginia's consensual sodomy law against right to
privacy attacks. "8
The Court continued to struggle with defining the contours of the
privacy right, mainly in evaluating contraception and abortion statutes
aimed at minors. The most important doctrinal development, after Roe,
was the Court's recognition in 1979 that "'parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society"' justified some state restrictions upon minors'
abortion choices.1 9 In Dronenburgv. Zech, Judge Robert Bork surveyed
the Court's privacy jurisprudence in a case involving the discharge of a
116. See Tribe, supra note 9.
117. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1975) (per curiam); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S.
21, 22 (1973), rev'g 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Canfield v. Oklahoma, 414 U.S. 991
(1973), dismissingappealfrom 506 P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Connor v. Arkansas, 414
U.S. 991 (1973), dismissing appealfrom 490 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1973).
118. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court).
119. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (quoting Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629
(1968)). by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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Navy cryptographer for engaging in a consensual relationship with another
Navy man. 121Judge Bork's analysis was a brilliant legal distillation of the
anti-gay constitutionalism pioneered by Save Our Children. First, Judge
Bork carefully analyzed the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence and
demonstrated that the Court had only extended the right to activities
relating to marriage, decisions whether to procreate, family relationships,
and childrearing and education. 12 Those cases did not "provide even an
ambiguous warrant" for Dronenberg's claimed right to engage in what
Judge Bork deemed "homosexual conduct" (not just sodomy).' Second,
Judge Bork opined that the Constitution not only tolerates but also
contemplates that the state will adopt laws grounded upon We the People's
concepts of morality. Unless constitutional text says otherwise, the
democratic process is free to regulate. "If the revolution in sexual mores
that [Dronenberg] proclaims is in fact ever to arrive, we think it must
arrive through the moral choices of the people and their elected
representatives, not through the judicial ukase of this court."' 23 These first
two propositions decided the case before Judge Bork, but he felt it
appropriate to add, in dicta, that even if anti-homosexual morality were not
a sufficient basis for expelling Dronenburg, the legitimate needs of the
Navy were. "The effects of homosexual conduct within a naval or military
unit are almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline." Among the
reasons were that "[e]pisodes of this sort" are certain "to generate dislike
and disapproval among many who find homosexuality morally offensive,"
and "to enhance the possibility of homosexual seduction. '124
Two years later, the Supreme Court finally adjudicated the
constitutionality of applying state sodomy laws to private consensual
activities in Bowers v. Hardwick.'25 Justice White's brusque opinion for
the Court followed Judge Bork's analytical model in Dronenburg.Like
Judge Bork, Justice White framed the constitutional issue as whether
' 26
Hardwick had a fundamental right to engage in "homosexual sodomy,'
limited the Court's previous privacy precedents to situations unique to
heterosexual couples (marriage, procreation, family), and found that
Georgia was within its constitutional discretion to criminalize homosexual
sodomy to reflect "majority sentiments about the morality of
homosexuality."'2 7 Unlike Judge Bork's opinion, Justice White's opinion

120. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
121. Id. at 1395.
122. Id. at 1397.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1398.
125. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
126 ld. at 190.
127. Id. at 196.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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engaged in a historical examination to determine whether the nation's legal
traditions supported such a constitutional right and found none that were
relevant. "Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such
conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'

.

.. is, at

best, facetious."' 28 As Justice Stevens demonstrated in his dissent, Justice
White's history was, at best, superficial, and subsequent scholars have
shown that it is riddled with anachronism and error.'2 9
Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurring opinion elaborating30
on Justice White's historical discussion and deepening its anachronism.
Blackstone, the English commentator every American lawyer would have
known at Independence, described "'the infamous crime againstnature'
as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape.' 3 1 Sodomy was a capital
crime until the nineteenth century. "To hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast
aside millennia of moral teaching."' 32 Justice Powell's gentler concurring
opinion suggested that a prison term for acts of consensual sodomy within
the home would be subject to Eighth Amendment question, but
Hardwick's case did not present that issue.133 Justice Powell concluded
condemned
"for the reasons stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct 134
for hundreds of years has now become a fundamental right."'
Speaking for four dissenters, Justice Blackmun argued that the case was
''no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,'
... than Stanley v. Georgia ....[had been] about a fundamental right to

watch obscene movies.' 35 The statute made no such distinction; indeed,
the state had expanded the law in 1968 to make sure it included
heterosexual as well as homosexual cunnilingus. 136 Hardwick was only
asking for the right to be left alone that the state conceded to married
couples and Eisenstadt assured unmarried straight couples. The Court's
sexual privacy precedents guarantee his freedom to make decisions

128. Id.at 194.
129. The Court was right to say that sodomy was long condemned by Anglo-American law,
but the damnable conduct was always understood to apply to men and women, men or women with
breasts, as well as men and men. The crime against nature could be committed by married men with
their wives. Id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of deeper historical problems
with the Court's opinion, see Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and PoliticalValues:
SearchingfortheHiddenDeterminantsofBowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography,1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 631.
130. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
131. Id. at 197 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *215).
132. Id. For critique of Burger's historical discussion, see the sources cited supra note 129.
133. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 198 n.2.
135. Id.at 199 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
136.byId.
Published
UFat200&n.1.
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regarding intimate relations, and its privacy-of-the-home precedents
guarantee his freedom against state intrusion into certainplaces.137 "[T]he
right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of
his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's
protection of privacy."' 3 Even if Hardwick had no fundamental right,
however, Blackmun argued that anti-homosexual sentiments could not
provide the rational basis the Constitution requires for any statute,
especially criminal laws. 139 Certainly, the sectarian justifications
emphasized by the state (and the Chief Justice) cannot be a neutralreason
that can justify "invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who
choose to live their lives differently."' 4 °
B. Equal Protection (No State Obligations)
Since the 1960s, gay rights advocates and litigants have argued that
homosexuals are a minority unfairly persecuted because of social prejudice
and unfounded stereotypes. The Burger Court denied review to the few
cases squarely raising such claims. One case was Rowland v. Mad River
Local School District,4 ' where the lower courts had upheld the discharge
of a high school guidance counselor because she was an admitted bisexual.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that there was no violation of equal protection
because Rowland was not fired simply because of her status as a bisexual,
but also because she spoke about it to her secretary and the assistant
principal-a disclosure that sent Mad River into a protect-the-childrenfrom-this-knowledge frenzy.'42 Dissenting from the denial of review,
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, laid out substantive reasons
for reversing the lower court. 143 Because Rowland's disclosure was speech
protected by the First Amendment, she could not be fired for that reason.'"
Nor could the state discriminate because of her bisexuality. Sexual
orientation-like sex, illegitimacy, and race-ought to be a suspect
classification.145 Like people of color, the group stigmatized by the
classification (bisexuality) has been the object of hostile state action
reflecting prejudice rather than rationality and has been relatively

137. Id. at 203-04 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)).
138. Id. at 208.
139. Id. at 208 n.3.
140. Id.at 213.
141. 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), denying cert. to 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
142. See 730 F.2d at 446.
143. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1009-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
144. Id. at 1011-14.
145. Id. at 1014 & nn.7-8.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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powerless in the political process. Even if sexual orientation were not a
suspect classification per se, Justice Brennan argued that the state bears a
high burden ofjustification when it denies a minority group public rights,
including employment opportunities, because of either their private choices
and conduct or their "nondisruptive expression of homosexual
preference." '46 There is no evidence that Justice Brennan's and Justice
Marshall's other seven colleagues had any sympathy or even understanding
for this line of argument.
Judge Bork certainly believed it was hokum. In Dronenburg,he ruled
that the constitutionality of homosexual sodomy laws foreclosed equal
protection claims by homosexuals. 47 The Uniform Code of Military
Justice made consensual sodomy by military personnel a serious crime,
punishable by prison time and/or dishonorable discharge from the armed
forces.148 After ruling that this policy did not violate Dronenburg's privacy
rights, Judge Bork ruled that it required dismissal of his equality claim as
well. Homosexuals are, by definition, people whose sexual enjoyment
comes from acts that are felonious. Therefore, discrimination against
homosexuals is based upon their (presumed) conduct and not their status.
The Supreme Court's race and sex equality jurisprudence polices statusbased, rather than conduct-based, discriminations and so is wholly
inapplicable.' 49
The logical appeal of Judge Bork's opinion rested primarily upon a
greater-includes-the-lesser mode of reasoning: If the Navy can imprison
James Dronenburg for having consensual sex with a nineteen-year-old
seaman, it surely has the discretion to choose a more humane sanction,
namely, expulsion. But the opinion also had an emotional appeal directly
linked to the Constitution of Anti-Homosexual Disgust and Contagion.
Like Save Our Children, Judge Bork believed that the Constitution allows
states to adopt laws with no other purpose than the expression of moral
principles. He further believed that disgust most Americans "naturally"
have for "homosexual conduct" is a morality-based reason that can
constitutionally justify the state's decision either to imprison Dronenburg
(no privacy right) or expel him (no equality right), or both. Unless a more
specific provision is violated, the Constitution imposes no limits on state
laws animated by anti-homosexual disgust. And if a neutral reason were
needed, it is easy to find-because homosexuals are disgusting and
contagious! According to Judge Bork, "[t]he effects of homosexual
conduct within a naval or military unit are almost certain to be harmful to

146. Id. at 1014-16.
147. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1388-89, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
148. Id. at 1389 & n.1.
Id.
at Law
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1398.
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'
Among the reasons were that "[e]pisodes of this
morale and discipline."15
sort are certain ....to generate dislike and disapproval among many who
find homosexuality morally offensive, and .... to enhance the possibility
of homosexual seduction. '

C. FirstAmendment (No ContagiousSpeech)
The First Amendment explicitly bars the government from abridging
a person's freedom of speech and publication, and implicitly bars the
government from invading his or her freedom of association. Surely these
specific, and unqualified, rights guarantee homosexuals protection against
state censorship. The Warren Court, no friend to the homosexual, ruled
that the First Amendment protected nonobscene homophile materials from
state censorship.152 The Burger Court, in contrast, expanded the definition
of "obscene" materials (definitionally unprotected by the First
Amendment) not only to include homo-erotica, but also to render
homosexuality itself the epitome of obscenity, viz. disgusting materials. In
Miller v. California,'5 3 the Court upheld state suppression of materials the
state described as "depictions of cunnilingus, sodomy, buggery and other
similar sexual acts performed in groups of two or more."' 54 Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court could not bear even to name these
perversions, but it did manage to expand permissible state regulation of
obscene speech to include materials offensive to the moral standards of the
local, rather than national, community. 155Miller triggered a brief new wave
of censorship, especially of gay publications, almost all of which the
Burger Court upheld, sometimes in openly homophobic opinions.15 6

150. Id. at 1398.
151. Id.
152. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam) (summarily reversing
censorship on the basis of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (invalidating a state law barring depictions of "sexual
immorality, perversion, or lewdness . . . as desirable" in movies, as this was viewpoint
discrimination); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (overturning censorship of male
physique magazines).
153. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
154. Brief for Respondent at 26, Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (No. 70-73).
155. Miller, 413 U.S. at 36-37; see also Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 117 (1973)
(holding obscene a book describing "every conceivable variety of sexual contact, homosexual and
heterosexual"); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (upholding the closure of an
adult theater).
156. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-72 & nn.3-5 (1977) (White, J.) (upholding a
statute criminalizing the depiction of "abnormal" sex and lumping together rape, sado-masochistic
sex, and same-sex foreplay and intercourse); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challengingthe Apartheid
of the Closet: EstablishingConditionsforLesbian andGayIntimacy, Nomos, & Citizenship, 19611981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 892-95 (1997) (describing the binge of anti-gay censorship and the
Supreme Court's ongoing encouragement).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
26

Eskridge: Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust
DUNWODYDISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW3

1037

Notwithstanding these efforts, pornography grew like weeds in a vacant
lot, and the cases stopped coming to the Supreme Court, in part because
most governments (including the federal government) abandoned their
efforts at censorship of adult pornography and in part because local
censorship efforts were easily evaded by national channels of
communication.
As in the sodomy and equal protection cases, the Burger Court was not
eager to take review in cases involving homosexuals' expression, and
sometimes this gave gay rights a boost. Most lower federal courts were
skeptical of the censorship of gay student groups at state universities, and
none of these cases reached the Supreme Court. In Ratchfordv. GayLib,'57
within a year of the Save Our Children campaign, the Court denied review
of a decision that the University of Missouri could not, consistent with the
neutrality the First Amendment imposes on state universities, purge its
campus of a student gay rights group. 58 Dissenting from the Court's
refusal to take the appeal, Justice Rehnquist saw the case as one involving
"the extent to which a self-governing democracy, having made certain acts
[i.e., homosexual sodomy] criminal, may prevent or discourage individuals
from engaging in speech or conduct which encourages others to violate
those laws."15' 9 This was an open appeal to generalize anti-homosexual
disgust as a basis for curtailing the free speech and anticensorship norms
as applied to gay people and their friends. 6° Rehnquist's dissent then
rejected the students' argument that they were engaged in protected speech
and association. No, their advocacy was tantamount to conduct that was
not only disgusting but also contagious, Rehnquist argued. If so,
the question is more akin to whether those suffering from
measles have a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine
regulations, to associate together and with others who do not
presently have measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law
providing that measle sufferers be quarantined. The very act
of assemblage under these circumstances undercuts a
significant interest of the State .... 161
Rehnquist suggested that "this danger [of contagion] may be particularly
acute in the university setting where many students are still coping with

157. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
158. See Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434
U.S. 1080 (1978).
159. Ratchford, 434 U.S. at 1082 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
160. See Gay Lib, 558 F.2d at 850 n.3, 851 & n.4. It was also a serious overstatement, as
Missouri then criminalized homosexual sodomy only as a misdemeanor and the student club did
not advocate breaking the law.
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
U.S. at 1084
(Rehnquist,
Ratchford,
161. by
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the sexual problems that accompany late adolescence and early
adulthood."' 62
It is hard to imagine a more explicit statement of the Constitution of
Anti-Homosexual Disgust and Contagion than Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion. Justice Blackmun joined every line of it, and Chief
Justice Burger also registered a dissent from the Court's refusal to hear the
case. 163 The other Justices did not reveal their views, but the division
within the Court became clearer in Board of Education v. National Gay
Task Force.164 In 1978, months before the defeat of the Briggs Initiative,
a near-unanimous Oklahoma legislature honored Anita Bryant, its native
daughter, by enacting a statute stipulating that school boards could suspend
or dismiss public school teachers or teachers' aids for either "'public
homosexual activities"' (namely, "public" sodomy) or "'public
homosexual conduct."", 165 The law defined the latter as "'advocating,

soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting public or private
homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such
conduct will come to the attention of school children or school
employees.'"1 66 The law would seem to violate core tenets of the Court's

First Amendmentjurisprudence, which protects "advocacy" even of illegal
conduct except when the advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."' 67
Notwithstanding this jurisprudence, the trial judge upheld the statute by
interpreting it narrowly, allowing discipline only when a teacher's pro-gay
advocacy creates a "'material and substantial disruption"' in the
classroom. 16 A divided Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected
that gloss on the statute and ruled it unconstitutional because it was
"overbroad, [was] 'not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the
state courts,' and 'its deterrent effect on legitimate expression [was] both
real and substantial."",169 A dissenting judge argued that, because

"[s]odomy is malum in se, i.e., immoral and corruptible in its nature," any
teacher who promotes it in any way "is in fact and in truth inciting school

162. Id. at 1083.
163. Id. at 1080 (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("The Chief Justice would
grant the petition and give plenary consideration to this case.").
164. 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
165. Bd. of Educ. v. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Okla. Stat. tit. 70 § 6-103.15).
166. Id. (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 70 § 6-103.15).
167. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam), quoted in Nat'l Gay Task
Force, 729 F.2d at 1274 (1984). In Brandenburg, the Court overturned a conviction of KKK
members who called for the suppression of minority races but not for immediate lawless actions
against them. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 444-45 (per curiam).
168. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1272 (quoting the trial judge).
169. Id. at 1274 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)). 28
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children to participate in the abominable and detestable crime against
nature."' 17 The Supreme Court accepted review in the case. As Justice
Blackman's conference notes reveal, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor were bothered by the possibility that
even discussion of disgusting homosexuality would create possibilities of
contagion among vulnerable schoolchildren.' 7 ' In the end, the Court
ducked this case as well, splitting four-to-four (with Justice Powell not
participating) and therefore creating no precedent.' 72
V. THE REHNQUIST COURT SETS (AMBIGUOUS) LIMITS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF ANTI-HOMOSEXUAL DISGUST AND CONTAGION

After Rowland,NationalGay Task Force,Dronenburg,and, especially,
Bowers v. Hardwick,lesbians, gaymen, and bisexuals viewed the Supreme
Court as a hostile institution that had capitulated to the constitutional
vision of Anita Bryant. Anti-gay body politics, with its emphasis on
disgusting homosexual conduct and contagious homosexuality, had no
discernible constitutional limits. Under Dronenburg, the state could not
only imprison homosexuals, but also discriminate in almost any way
against such persons because of public disgust and fear of contagion.
Bowers seemed to confirm the DronenburgConstitution, with possible
protection (thanks to the Powell concurring opinion) for homosexuals sent
to prison for consensual activities in the home. These decisions infuriated
gay Americans, many of whom came out of their closets (for this and other
reasons). According to Newsweek's poll, 22% of Americans had a close
friend they knew to be gay before Bowers, a figure that doubled to 43% by
1994.173 Many of these friends were lawyers. The Stonewall riots are
credited with triggering thousands of gay people to step out of their closets,
but very few of the uncloseted were lawyers. Lesbian and gay lawyers did
to continue
not come out in great numbers until Bowers, and they vowed
174
treatment.
decent
for
struggles
political,
as
well
legal, as
Almost all the constitutional and political efforts concentrated on state
courts and legislatures, with significant success in the Northeast, West
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Id. at 1276 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room,
Folder S (Notes for Conference in N6TF, No.83-2030).
Bd. of Educ. v. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903, 903 (1985).

173. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 73, at 16.

174. On post-Bowers law student campaigns to pressure law firms to welcome openly gay or
lesbian attorneys, see, e.g., Firms Step Up Hiring of Gay and Lesbian Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 1992; Jane Goldman, Coming Out Strong, CALIF. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 31; John Greenya, The
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Coast, and Great Lakes regions of the country. Many of gay people's
political successes were state and municipal laws prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination by employers and public accommodations, the
kind of law Save Our Children had overturned in Dade County. 75 Its
Constitution of Anti-Homosexual Disgust and Contagion turned to the
First Amendment to undermine pro-gay laws that traditionalists could not
defeat in the political process. They had a receptive audience in the
Rehnquist Court, which turned strongly to the right after liberal Justices
Brennan and Marshall were replaced by more conservative Republicans,
Justices Souter and Thomas. Centrist Justices White and Blackmun were
replaced by centrist Democrats, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Three of the
Bowers dissenters (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) were off the Court
by 1993.
In 1995, the Rehnquist Court expanded the First Amendment to protect
TFV speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group
' Massachusetts courts interpreted the state antidiscrimination
ofBoston. 76
law to require the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade to include a LGBT
marching group. A unanimous Court ruled that their inclusion violated the
traditionalist message of the parade organizers.
[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner
would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay,
lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized
marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual
orientations have as much claim to unqualified social
acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members ofparade
177
units organized around other identifying characteristics.
Like the homosexual schoolteacher in Oklahoma, the lesbian marcher in
Boston was by her presence tagged with representing disgusting conduct
and with advancing an unhealthy homosexual agenda. The parade
organizers were constitutionally entitled to treat this as a hostile viewpoint
and to distance themselves from it by excluding the group. This was a
viewpoint the parade organizers were entitled to exclude, ruled the
Court.,78
Hurley represented an important expansion of the First Amendment to
create a new right consistent with the Constitution of Anti-Homosexual
Disgust and Contagion. Scholars bemoaned what seemed like an
175.

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET

app. B2, at 356-61 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW] (listing state and local
antidiscrimination laws as of 1998).
176. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
177. Id. at 574.
178. Id. at 581.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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aggressive anti-gay judicial activism that complemented the anti-gay
' The year 1996
passivity of the Court in Rowland, NGTF, and Bowers. 79
represented the zenith of this Save Our Children Constitution.
Homosexuals had no constitutional rights to speak of, while traditionalists
enjoyed an expanding array of constitutional protections against having to
expose themselves to open homosexuals. Their Constitution had also gone
national in a big way. In 1993, President William Clinton and Senator Sam
Nunn (Democrats) joined General Colin Powell and Senator Bob Dole
(Republicans) in creating a permanent statutory exclusion of lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals from the armed forces. 18 Their justification was that
the presence of open homosexuals was so disgusting, and even potentially
contagious, to soldiers that morale and unit cohesion were undermined. In
May 1996, Senator Dole and President Clinton joined forces to support the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the most ambitious anti-gay legislation
in American history.18' DOMA sailed through Congress by huge majorities
and committed the federal government to discriminating against same-sex
married couples in more than one thousand federal statutory and regulatory
provisions creating benefits or obligations based on marriage and
spousehood. 82
'
As before, the argument was that "homosexual marriage" was so
disgusting to Americans that it threatened the institution of marriage for
everyone, and it was so contagious that it infringed the rights of parents
and children. Almost no one thought the Supreme Court would find the
blatant discrimination entailed in DOMA or the 1993 armed forces
exclusion to be unconstitutional. Although academics complained, the
judiciary and the country seemed to have accepted the Constitution of
Anti-Homosexual Disgust and Contagion. Indeed, these landmark statutes
have most of the hallmarks of what Bruce Ackerman deems to be
transformative constitutionalmoments.'83 Ackerman argues that the New

179. For criticisms of the Court's broad protection of traditionalists' right to exclude, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of 'Coming Out': Religion, Homosexuality, and
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997); Nan D.
Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissentfor Equality, 35 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1
(2000); Jed Rubenfeld, The FirstAmendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REv. 767 (2001).
180. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000); see also Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue Database, Robert
Crown Law Library at Stanford Law School, http://dont.stanford.edu (last visited Aug. 22, 2005).
181. 1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
182. Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Accounting Office, to the
Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Jan. 31,
1997) (identifying 1049 federal laws and regulations in which rights or duties depend on marital
status), available at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/browse/ gao.report.on.federal.marriage.benefits01.31.97.
183.

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 49-50 (1991) (discussing historical
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Deal changed the Constitution because the showdown between President
Roosevelt and the Old Court was resolved, thanks to Roosevelt's 1936
landslide victory, in his favor. 184 Ackerman's model is that We the People
have engaged in higher lawmaking in these circumstances: "Interbranch
Impasse

-

Decisive Election - Reformist Challenge to Conservative

Branches - Switch in Time.'1 5 The gay rights issues fit the model in
every way except the timing of the election: President Clinton proposed in
January 1993 that gay people be allowed to serve, Congress and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff objected, the President backed down in the face of popular
opposition, and his party was routed in the 1994 election, in part because
Clinton was considered pro-gay. DOMA might have been an even more
decisive constitutional moment because tiny Hawaii's suggestion that
same-sex marriage was on the way provoked a congressional reaction that
the President joined immediately.
Yet at the apex of its triumph, in 1995-96, Anita Bryant's
Constitution-the Constitution of Anti-Homosexual Disgust and
Contagion-ran into trouble from an unlikely source, namely, a Supreme
Court filled with Reagan-Bush Republicans.'86 The trouble began,
ironically, in Hurley. Justice Souter's majority opinion, for the first time
in Supreme Court history, treated gay litigants with respect and under an
apparent assumption that they actually enjoyed constitutional rights. "GLIB
was formed.., in order to celebrate its members' identity as openly gay,
lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show that
there are such individuals in the community ...
."187 Souter deemed their
activity "equally expressive" as that of the parade organizers, and
presumably protected by the First Amendment.'88 Albeit nothing more than
a suggestion teased out of dicta, this logic would have probably required
overturning the Briggs Initiative and the Oklahoma teachers' statute.
A more explicit curtailment of anti-gay constitutionalism came in May
1996, shortly after DOMA had been introduced in Congress. Like Dade
County in 1977, several Colorado cities had adopted sexual orientation

in constitutional history").
184. Id. at 48-50.
185. Id. at 49.
186. Four of the Justices (Rehnquist as Chief Justice and O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy as
Associate Justices) were appointed by President Reagan, and two justices (Justices Souter and
Thomas) were appointed by the first President Bush. Members of the Supreme Court (1789 to
Present), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/about.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). Onejustice
(Justice Stevens) was a Republican appointed by President Ford. Id. Two justices (Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer) were Democrats appointed by President Clinton. Id.
187. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570
(1995).
188. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
32

2005]

Eskridge: Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust
DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

antidiscrimination laws.189 Unable to revoke them at the local level,
Colorado for Family Values (CFV) sought to amend the state constitution
to preempt them.190 Its campaign to persuade voters to adopt the
Amendment was a version of the popular Constitution of AntiHomosexual Disgust and Contagion. CFV made the following arguments
in advertisements and its voter information pamphlet: Pedophilia, said
CFV, "is actually an accepted part of the homosexual community!" Not
only do "homosexuals" molest children, but they are pushing educational
materials that "try and convince children-maybe even your own-that
they should consider homosexuality!" "Homosexuals" are sexually
promiscuous. "'Monogamy' is virtually unknown in the homosexual
lifestyle." Gay men tend to be afflicted with AIDS. Even those not afflicted
with AIDS die young; according to CFV, the average reported age of death
for gay men is 42 years old and for lesbians, 45 years old. "To this angry,
alienated minority, the family is the symbol of everything they attack."
"Militant" gay rights people want to destroy the family and the state's
churches. "'Gay-rights' destroys basic freedoms." The freedom of "your
child" at the University of Colorado not to have a gay roommate has been
taken away by Boulder's antidiscrimination law. Gay rights will suppress
free speech and deny straight people jobs they ought to have. 19'
Responding to this still-powerful body politics, Colorado voters
adopted Amendment 2, and thereby added to their constitution a new
provision prohibiting or preempting any law or policy "whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination."' 92 The ACLU and
local gay rights groups challenged this unprecedented initiative as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'93 Although the Colorado courts
agreed with the challengers, they seemed to have an uphill battle when the

189. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624-25 (1996) (citing DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN.
CODE, art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991); ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977); BOULDER,
COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987), and explaining that these ordinances "gave rise
to... statewide controversy" because of the "protection [they] afforded to persons discriminated
against by reason of their sexual orientation").
190. On the CFV campaign to overturn the local antidiscrimination laws, see STEPHEN
BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS.COLORADO AND AMERICA: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMENDMENT 2

(1994).
191. These quotations are taken from the ballot pamphlet supporting Colorado's Amendment
2 (1992), reprintedin ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 106, app. 3, at 1523-31.
192. COLO.CONST. art. II, § 30b (held unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996)).
193. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1271-73 (Colo. 1993), aff'g No. 92 CV 7223, 1993
WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993).
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Supreme Court took review in late 1995.194 Colorado Solicitor General
Tim Tymkovich relied on a kinder, gentler version of the Constitution of
Disgust and Contagion to argue that this anti-gay discrimination was
needed to conserve scarce resources for enforcing civil rights laws; to
protect the rights of landlords and employers not to associate with gay
people; and to send a message that homosexuality was disapproved by the
state. 19 5 All of these policies are more rational-seeming than the antihomosexual sentiment held to be a rational basis for sodomy laws in
Bowers v. Hardwick,'96 but a six-Justice majority ruled in Romer v. Evans
that the Colorado initiative was invalid because "its sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects."19' 7 The
Court characterized the initiative as a "status-based" law aimed at a class
of citizens; such laws violate the core equal protection command that "'a
bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest." 1 98
Vigorously dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that Romer's holding was
completely inconsistent with Bowers.' 99 He was right.200 Handed down
almost 100 years to the day after Plessy v. Ferguson,0 ' Romer certainly
seemed to be at least a qualified rejection of the Constitution of AntiHomosexual Disgust and Contagion that was articulated most completely
in Dronenburg,a decision that Scalia joined when he was a judge on the
D.C. Circuit,20 2 and that precisely anticipated the reasoning as well as the
result in Bowers.2"3 To begin with, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
announced that it was not permissible for the state constitution to say that
the state and local governments are free to engage in any kind of anti-gay
discrimination.2 4 Under Amendment 2, a lesbian could presumably sue
Denver for discriminating against her because she was a woman, but
194. See Romer v. Evans, 513 U.S. 1146 (1995).
195. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-5, 17-25, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No.
94-1039).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 125-40.
197. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
198. Id.at 634-35 (quoting U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
199. Id.at 636 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
200. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHiNGTOWARDS GOMORRAH 112-14(1996) (urging the
Court to abandon Romer and reaffirm Bowers); ESKRIDGE, GAYLA, supranote 175, 150-51,20911 (urging the Court to abandon Bowers); Thomas C. Grey, Gay Rights and the Courts: The
Amendment 2 Controversy: Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 373 (1997)
(similar).
201. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (decided on May 20); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) (decided on May 18).
202. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 125-40.
204. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-27.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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Denver could win the lawsuit by claiming it only discriminated against her
because she was a lesbian who was disgusting to other Coloradans.
"Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of
its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. 2 5
Romer abrogates Dronenburg's suggestion that such discrimination is
constitutionally permissible.20 6 That was a fundamental retreat from Save
Our Children's constitutionalism.
Justice Kennedy also rejected Tymkovich's constitutionalism, under
which tolerant Coloradans do not criminalize homosexual conduct that
disgusts them but can assure landlords and employers (and co-workers)
freedom to avoid contact and possible contagion." This was straight out
of Mary Douglas and Leviticus: The holy should not mix with the
unholy.20 8 Justice Kennedy not only found "it impossible to credit" this
justification, but he ruled that the breadth of the new constitutional
language was so far removed from it that the Court was left with the
inference that Amendment 2 was inspired by "animus" toward the
excluded class. 209 This was a remarkable holding. The CFV ballot
materials quoted above support Justice Kennedy's conclusion, as false
stereotypes and appeals to prejudice pervade those materials.210 What
Judge Bork considered morality in Dronenburg, Justice Kennedy
considered animus in Romer.
If popular disgust toward homosexual sodomy could not supply the
rational basis for state discrimination against homosexuals under the Equal
Protection Clause, could it supply the rational basis under the Due Process
Clause for making homosexual sodomy a crime? In Lawrence v. Texas,211
the Court said it could not. In another opinion by Justice Kennedy, the
Court overruled Bowers' holding that anti-homosexual disgust or morality
could form a rational basis for state criminal prohibitions. 2 12 That holding,
alone, represented a repudiation of the Constitution of Anti-Homosexual
Disgust and Contagion, but Justice Kennedy's reasoning process deepened
the rejection. To begin with, Justice Kennedy substantially accepted the
academic criticisms that Bowers' historical analysis was riddled with errors
and anachronisms, but then he conceded that

205. Id. at 633.
206. SeeDronenburg,746 F.2d at 1583.
207. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
208. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
209. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634-35.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.
211. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
212. by
Id.UF
at 578.
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the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for
centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and
acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family.
For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles
to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of
their lives. These considerations do not answer the question
before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use
the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law. 'Our obligation
is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code. 1213
This was a remarkable claim: A Constitution that credits anti-homosexual
morality is one that is not truly neutral, and judges must be wary of
allowing their own attitudes of disgust to influence their application of the
law. Thus fell the central principle of Dronenburg,Bowers, and the Save
Our Children Constitution.
Consistent with that sweeping move, Justice Kennedy linked Texas's
denial of ordinary sexual liberties to gay people with its denial of equal
protection ofthe laws. "When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the
law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres. 2 4 This was unacceptable to the Court. "Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
'
overruled."215
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lawrence lacked the untamed
passion of his Romer dissent, but it was still a hard-hitting plea for the
Court (or the country) to resuscitate the Constitution of Disgust and
Contagion. In addition to several technical objections to the majority's
reasoning, Justice Scalia accused the Court of trumping the popular will
with the views of legal elites. Morality ought to be a rational basis for
criminal laws, especially when the moral judgment involved contagion as
well as disgust.
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as

213. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)
(joint opinion)).
214. Id. at 575.
215. Id. at 578.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's
schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as
protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that
they believe to be immoral and destructive.216
The contagion threatened by the Court extended way beyond Texas's
sodomy law. The Court has opened Pandora's Box, creating a
constitutional rule debarring the state from enacting laws criminalizing
polygamy, fornication, adultery, incest, obscenity, bestiality, prostitution,
and masturbation.217 Scalia's point is that almost everybody is disgusted by
something on this list, and so the Court's protection of "homosexual
sodomy" is doubly or triply disgusting and, in fact, threatens to unleash a
torrent of disgust. More alarmingly, the Court's opinion adopts the
"homosexual agenda," which Scalia defines as "the agenda promoted by
some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium
that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct., 218 And the
homosexual agenda now features same-sex marriage, which Justice Scalia
claims will now be imported from Canada.219 Foreign homosexual
contagion is the worst, one suspects.
V. WHY CONSERVATIVES SHOULD ABANDON THE CONSTITUTION OF
ANTI-HOMOSEXUAL DISGUST AND CONTAGION

Justice Scalia made two kinds of claims in his Romer and Lawrence
dissents. One is that the Court should be confirming rather than limiting
Anita Bryant's and Robert Bork's Constitution of Anti-Homosexual
Disgust and Contagion. The second is that these decisions in fact have
completely abandoned that Constitution in favor of the Homosexual
Agenda Constitution. Both claims are false. Even conservative
Republicans-indeed, especially such Justices-ought to reject the
Constitution ofAnti-Homosexual Disgust and Contagion. It is inconsistent
with the original purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the
stable pluralist system created by the Constitution. Abandoning that
Constitution, however, does not entail adoption of the Homosexual
Agenda Constitution, and certainly not immediately.

216. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 590 (contending that "[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are... sustainable
only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices"); id. at 599, 600.
218. Id. at 602.
219. by
Id.UF
at604.
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A. Conservative Theories of Constitutionalism in a
PluralistDemocracy

Why should constitutional conservatives (as well as progressive
constitutionalists) be skeptical of the Borkian Constitution of AntiHomosexual Disgust and Contagion? One reason is libertarian. The
American Revolution and the Constitution of 1789 were strongly
libertarian. The Declaration of Independence asserted that it was "selfevident" that men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights," to wit: "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."22 ° Consistent
with social contract theory, the Revolutionaries and then the Framers of the
Constitution established national governments whose federalist and
separated-powers structure would assure citizens of breathing room to
enjoy their traditional liberties."' A body politics that assails a group of
citizens as disgusting and contagious tends to create sprawling regulatory
schemes and apparatuses. Although Dade County Save Our Children
sought to repeal a regulatory statute, protecting gay people against job
discrimination,2 2 2 California Save Our Children's Briggs Initiative would
have created a potentially terrorizing gendarmerie to police schoolteacher
behavior, expression, and even pedagogy.22 3 Before Anita Bryant, Florida's
Johns Commission subjected thousands of Floridians to humiliating
interrogations and spying; dozens, perhaps hundreds, lost their jobs or
were expelled from the University of Florida and other state colleges.22 4
Such disgust-based regulatory schemes tend to sacrifice the liberties of
the minority in pursuit of goals that are often not linked to the common
good. The constitutional checks and balances that ordinarily preserve
liberty against crazy regulation do not work when the body politick is
bestirred by an effective body politics. This alone is cause for
constitutional concern, but there is a deeper reason the Libertarian
Constitution might discourage this kind of body politics. A politics of
disgust and contagion tends to demonize the minority as subhuman, not
just mischevous. When Anita Bryant referred to homosexuals as "these
vile beastly creatures," when she compared exposing children to
homosexuals with forcing them to eat "garbage," when she reminded
citizens that Leviticus required death for sodomites, she was inviting her

220. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).

221. Patrick M. Garry,Religious FreedomDeserves More Than Neutrality: The Constitutional
Argument for NonpreferentialFavoritismof Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 37 (2005) (explaining
how a "multiplicity of sects" guards against the threat of majority tyranny) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
222. See supra Part I.
223. See supra Part I.

224. See Eskridge, supra note 76, at 748-50.
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audience to treat gays as animals, as refuse, as stuff to be disposed of.22 5
Her body politics turned homosexuals into non-people. There is no more
antilibertarian role that the state can play than to be a forum or even a
conduit for this kind of discourse.
To be sure, Anita Bryant presented her campaign as one protecting the
liberties of parents and children not to be exposed to homosexuality.226
Requiring churches, families, or even Boy Scout troops to accept
homosexuals within their intimate associations represents valid liberty
claims,227 but requiring workplaces and public accommodations to
integrate are not deep invasions of personal liberty in an interdependent
world.22 More important, allowing a schoolteacher to be openly lesbian
does not impose upon unhappy parents or even traumatized children the
kind of scarlet letter that body politics imposes upon homosexuals. Even
the most politically correct regulations do not trumpet an image of the
bigot as someone whose body is a corrupt situs of disgusting actions,
whose soul is degenerate and subhuman, and whose polluted presence is
contagious. In short, even if traditionalist claims can be deemed liberties,
the demonization of the anti-gay bigot is in no way commensurable with
the demonization of the homosexual.
There is a second, perhaps more fundamental, reason why
constitutional conservatives should reject the Constitution of AntiHomosexual Disgust and Contagion. It is inconsistent with the proper
functioning of America's democratic pluralism. Although democratic
pluralism is not an explicit theme of the Constitution the way liberty is, it
was the animating idea behind the Religion Clauses and is a precondition
for the survival of constitutionalism itself I have developed this theme in
a companion article, but let me suggest its contours here.22 9
A pluralist political system is one whose goal is the accommodation of
the interests of as many salient groups as possible, without disturbing the
ability of the state and the community to press forward with collective
projects.23 ° In a pluralist democracy, social, economic, and ideological
groups compete for the approval and support of representatives and the
electorate. The state, in turn, encourages groups to participate in the
marketplace of politics. If significant groups became alienated from, or
225.
226.
227.
228.
(1984).

See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
E.g., Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609

229. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005).
230. ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND

CONSENT 24 (1967); Nicholas R. Miller, PluralismandSocial Choice, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 734,
734-36 (1983).
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even turned against, the pluralist democratic process, the polity is
weakened. Alienation of many groups brings the polity down. Turmoil and
social violence are possible; civil war is the nightmare scenario. Culture
wars and intense normative polarities within the country pose threats to the
stability of the country's governance.
Drawing from European experience, political scientist Adam
Przeworski has concluded: "Constitutions that are observed and last for a
long time are those that reduce the stakes of political battles." 23 ' Although
the Framers of our Constitution did not anticipate our modern culture wars,
they too appreciated the fragility of democracy when the "stakes" of
politics get too high. Stakes get high when the system becomes embroiled
in bitter disputes that drive salient, productive groups away from
engagement in pluralist politics. Groups will disengage when they believe
that participation in the system is pointless due to their permanent defeat
on issues important to them or due to their perception that the process is
stacked against them, or when the political process imposes fundamental
burdens upon them or threatens their group identity or cohesion. At the
founding of our nation, religion was the classic example of high-stakes
politics. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment232 sought to lower
the stakes of religion-based politics, essentially by forbidding the state
from discriminating against persons based upon their religious beliefs (the
Free Exercise Clause) and from imposing religious orthodoxy upon
everyone (the Establishment Clause).233
One reason religious politics was high stakes was the strong cultural
connection between religion and social identity. So persecuting someone
for her religion or forcing orthodoxy upon all citizens was an affront to the
deeply held, primordial identities of many-precisely the kind of state
policy that would drive minorities out of the system, and maybe against it.
Religious antimony had another divisive feature: Opposing parties in
religion-based culture wars typically not only had contempt for one
another's views, but also considered opponents disgusting and their
theologies a contagion. America's long history of anti-Catholicism and
anti-Semitism, for example, not only condemned these faiths as
theologically wrong or even Godless, but also dismissed the faithful as
disgusting. In communities where Catholics and Jews were marginalized
minorities, majorities labeled them dirty, filthy, promiscuous, sex-crazed,

231.

ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36-37 (1991).

232. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...").
233.

Cf STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL

DEMOCRACY 202-09, 222-27 (1995) (interpreting the Religion Clauses to support "gag rules"
keeping combustible issues off the public agenda).
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sodomy-obsessed, and indecent. 234 Together with the politics of race and
slavery, emotional religion-based disputes were our nation's first and
dirtiest body politics.
Religious wars are destructive enough, but a religious war where the
state takes sides, which is properly called "Kulturkampf," is potentially
disastrous for the polity. 235 The Religion Clauses recognized this and
instantiated a jurisprudence of tolerance as regards religion. The central
idea is that "religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to
be either proscribed or prescribed by the State. 2 36 This not only kept the
state from engaging in Kulturkampfs, but it has actually had the effect of
lowering the stakes of religion-based body politics more generally. Over
time, religious majorities learned to live with minorities, which undercut
the nastiest features of body politics. Minorities felt more secure that they
would not be eradicated so long as they played by the legal rules, and that
gave them an incentive not to defect. Most important, the jurisprudence of
tolerance pressed religious politics away from the body politics of disgust
and contagion and toward positive appeals to values more widely shared
in the community. Paradoxically, such a jurisprudence of tolerance has
contributed to a country where religious faith has flourished in a rainbow
array of denominations, even as the Religion Clauses are heatedly debated,
litigated, and enforced to keep the state reasonably neutral.
As I have argued earlier, the philosophy of the Religion Clauses
provides a philosophy through which to apply the open-textured provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 37 By lowering the stakes of homosexual
body politics, the Court is creating spaces in which two conflicting groups
can co-exist, and maybe learn to tolerate one another. If they never learn
to tolerate one another, the Court will not let them hurt one another,
especially through state action. This philosophy, by the way, does not ask
the Supreme Court to sweep away anti-gay discriminations. Quite the
contrary, this is a conservativephilosophy that not only leaves the political
process alone most of the time, but also insists that traditionalist groups
receive the benefit of constitutional principle. Thus, a Constitution of
Tolerance does not allow homosexuals to rain on---or march in-the
traditionalists' parade, precisely as the Court held in Hurley.23 8 Nor does
234. See generally DINNERSTEIN, supra note 56 (describing various grounds for antiSemitism); LES WALLACE, THE RHETORIC OF ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE AMERICAN PROTECTIVE
ASSOCIATION, 1887-1911 (1990) (describing similar grounds for anti-Catholicism).
235. See Eskridge, supranote 179, at 2413-16 (explaining the meaning of"Kulturkampf" and
identifying the "two most prominent examples of Kulturkampf in the United States during the last
hundred years [as] the campaign in the 1880s to discipline the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints and the campaign in the 1950s to suppress homosexuality").
236. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-89 (1992); id. at 609-31 (Souter, J., concurring).
237. Eskridge, supranote 179, at 2427-30.
238. by
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it allow the state to target only politically incorrect hate speech, and leave
anti-religious hate speech unregulated, as the Rehnquist Court held in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.23 9 Indeed, my theory provides a neutral
justification for the Supreme Court's controversial opinion in Boy Scouts
v. Dale,24 handed down between Romer and Lawrence, and joined by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Expanding upon Hurley, Dale ruled that
the Boy Scouts was an expressive association that could not be required to
retain an "avowed homosexual" as an assistant scoutmaster.24 '
B. An OriginalistTheory of the FourteenthAmendment
There is a third reason constitutional conservatives should reject the
Constitution of Anti-Homosexual Disgust and Contagion: It is inconsistent
with the original expectations of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here, I am inspired by Judge Bork, the exemplar of modem
originalism. Admitting that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend to eliminate racial segregation, Bork defends Brown v. Board
of Education because it was consistent with the original purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to modem circumstances.242 The
principles undergirding Reconstruction include the liberty idea, analyzed
above, but also two other principles: legality and equality. Together, these
three principles constitute a constitutional understanding of the rule of law
as neutral, inclusive, and libertarian. Neutrality means that people are
evaluated by their conformity to rules of conduct needed to advance social
projects, not by their status or other "irrelevant" traits. Inclusion means the
rule of law is accessible to all; there is no pariah class in America.
Libertarian is the presumption that the state leaves us alone to choose our
own path to happiness. Consider these principles in greater detail.243
First is the principle of legality. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause was copied from the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 2' The framing generation understood the Fifth Amendment's
provision to reflect the Magna Carta's concept ofper legem terrem.245 For

(1995).
239. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a hate speech ordinance because it regulated only
politically incorrect hate speech, not hate speech targeting, for example, the devoutly religious).
240. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
241. Id. at 655.
242. Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciples and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 12-15 (1971); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OFAMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAw 75-82 (1990).
243. The discussion that follows is taken from the Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
244. Id. at 3.
245. Id.; THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST42
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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the government to act "according to the law of the land" required
something more than procedural regularity; it also required state officials
246
to follow the rule of law and not their own arbitrary whim or caprice.
Thus, defendants cannot be imprisoned unless a criminal statute clearly
announces the illegality of their conduct. 247 As the Supreme Court's post1868 precedents made clear, this requirement of due process was animated
not only by the defendant's need for adequate notice, but also by the notion
that official discretion be tightly cabined.248 Some of the precedents also
support a broader idea. In Papachristouv. City ofJacksonville, the Court
ruled that an "archaic" vagrancy law violated the Due Process Clause,
because it made "criminal activities which by modem standards are
normally innocent," and which are indeed fundamental freedoms
traditionally enjoyed by Americans. 24 9 The Jacksonville ordinance was not
intelligible to the "poor among us, the minorities, the average
householder," and seemed to be enforced mainly against "nonconformists"
and "suspicious persons."25 "The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities
as well as majorities, to the 'poor
as well as the rich, is the great mucilage
5
that holds society together." '
Second is the equality principle. 252 The Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment emphasized that "'the American system rests on the assertion
of the equal right of every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. "'253 This equality principle served two powerful norms:

UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 351 n. 1 (2d ed. 1871)

(1868) (translating the Magna Carta admonition that "[n]o freeman" should be imprisoned etc.
"unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land").
246. Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 243, at 3-4.
247. Id. at 4.
248. See Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrinein the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 80, 88-90 (1960).
The common fault of [vague statutes] ... is that each injects into the governmental
wheel so much free play that in the practical course of its operation it is likely to
function erratically ...and to result in a significant number of impermissible
public-versus-private-interest resolutions which are beyond the effective discovery
or appraisal of the Court.
Id. at 90.
249. 405 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1972).
250. Id.at 162, 169, 170.
251. Id.at 171; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (following
Papachristouto invalidate an antigang ordinance posing unacceptable risks to normal assembly on
city streets).
252. Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 243, at 4.
253. Id.(quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-89 (1866) (Rep. Bingham)). On the
equality rhetoric of Bingham and other framers, see WLLLAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT:
FROM
PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL
Published
by UF
LawPOLITICAL
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Repository,
2005 DOCTRINE 48-57, 71-80 (1988).
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rationality and anti-class legislation. Foundational for the modem liberal
state, the rationality norm insists that state differentiations be reasonably
connected to legitimate public policies and not be the result of prejudice
against an unpopular minority. Important for the peaceful functioning of
modem pluralist democracies, the anti-class legislation norm debars the
state from creating a subordinate underclass without very good
justification.254 As Justice Harlan argued in Plessy v. Ferguson, the
rationality and anti-class norms are two sides of the same equality coin.255
Although the obvious and immediate beneficiaries of this equality
principle were the freed slaves, the Framers understood the principle to
apply more broadly, to protect any social class against special penalties or
disabilities.256
Thirdisthe libertyprinciple.257 Before the Civil War,judges interpreted
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV to impose substantive limits on
government regulation of private activities that imposed no discernible
third-party effects. 8 When the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
borrowed the due process and privileges and immunities language to frame
rights in Section 1, they intended to provide specific protections of liberty
against state intrusion. Early on, the Supreme Court and some state courts
interpreted the Due Process
Clause to protect various dimensions of a
"right 'to be let alone.' 25 9 In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, the
Court recognized bodily integrity as a species of constitutionally protected
liberty and ruled that the state could not require a personal injury plaintiff
to submit to a medical examination. 260 In Maynard v. Hill2 6 and Meyer v.

Nebraska,262 the Court held that the state could not intrude into the
personal relationshipsof marriage and childrearing. A third line of cases
recognized the idea of physical inaccessibility:The state is barred, by the

254. Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 243, at 4-5. Introducing the revised draft of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "Senator Howard said it would 'abolish[]all class legislation in the States
and [do] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another."' Id. at 5 n,4 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (Sen. Howard)).
255. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

256. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting); NELSON, supra note 253, at 78-80.
257. Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 243, at 3, 5-6.
258. E.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (Justice

Washington construed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV to protect rights "which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments.").
259. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195

(1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888)); see also Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117

S.W. 383, 387 (Ky. 1909). For an intellectual history of the different constitutional ramifications
of this idea, see Ken Gormley, One HundredYears of Privacy, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 1335.
260. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
261. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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Fourth Amendment especially, from invading or snooping into people's
private spaces without a proper warrant.263
As they were applied in 1868, sodomy laws were not inconsistent with
these principles. As I argued to the Supreme Court in Lawrence, reported
cases in the nineteenth century were wholly limited to unconsented sexual
activities or, later on, public activities. 2' Hence, the libertarian
presumption was fully respected, nor was there an outlaw class of good
citizens created by these laws. As late as 1950, it was not clear that state
sodomy laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment, even though there were
prosecutions and exclusions based upon private consensual activities. In
1950, it was possible for educated Americans to believe that homosexuals
were a social menace. Doctors taught that they were mentally ill, indeed
psychopathic; law enforcement officers portrayed them as child molesters;
politicians and presidents dismissed them as disloyal.265
By 1977, when Save Our Children left its mark on American history,
social and legal circumstances had changed. The medical profession had
massively repudiated its prior understanding of homosexuality as a mental
illness; myths of the homosexual as a child molester or traitor were
discredited; and peaceful, productive lesbian and gay subcultures
flourished in-and reconstructed-cities all over the country.26 6 With these
social changes came a new sodomy jurisprudence. No longer were sodomy
laws enforced against private consensual activities; the only social role
served by consensual sodomy laws was to identify a subclass of
sodomites-the homosexuals-and mark them off as citizens who could
be subjected to a wide array of collateral state and private
discriminations. 267 At the very point Anita Bryant announced the
Constitution of Anti-Homosexual Disgust and Contagion, that Constitution
was at war with the original principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Likewise, the Burger Court era decisions following Save Our Children
Constitutionalism-Dronenburg and Bowers-were deeply wrong.
Conversely, the original principles underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment firmly support the Rehnquist Court's decisions in Romer and
Lawrence. Although Romer rested on the Equal Protection Clause and
Lawrence was a substantive due process decision, both of them have the

263. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of [his] life"); COOLEY, supra
note 245, at 299-300.
264. Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 243, at 11-15 & app. 2 (listing reported sodomy
cases from the nineteenth century). These passages are closely paraphrased in Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-69, 572 (2003).
265. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 175, at 57-62, 67-72.

266. Id. at 99-137.
at 209-11.
267. by
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same underlying message: The state cannot create a pariah class of useful,
productive citizens and deny them a broad range of legal rights and
protections simply because their presumed private activities are disgusting
to other citizens. The state may allow traditionalist churches and
neighborhood organizations to exclude such a group (Dale), and the state
is not required to protect unpopular minorities against private
discrimination (Romer). However, the state cannot tell gay people that they
are strangers to the law. The state cannot tell gay people they do not have
access to state services and courts for redress of their grievances (Romer)
or that they are presumptive outlaws who can for that reason be denied
civil service employment, licenses, and various state benefits (Lawrence).
Nor can the state tell gay people that the price of citizenship for them is to
remain in the closet. Just as traditionalists can proclaim themselves fans of
family values without state meddling, so lesbians and gay men can be open
about their sexual orientation. Race-based apartheid was a fundamental
denial of core Fourteenth Amendment principles; so too, ultimately, is the
apartheid of the closet.
C. PuttingIt All Together
Return to Justice Scalia's charge that the Constitution now bars the
state from any morals regulation altogether.26 8 The original principles
undergirding the Fourteenth Amendment plus the admonition against
raising the stakes of politics can be synthesized into doctrinal
variables-features of a liberty-infringing policy that render it more or less
constitutionally vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment. So a morals
law that criminalizes conduct that (1) is no longer widely criminalized and
(2) does not seem to impose harm on third parties but (3) is important to
a coherent and well-organized social group is most constitutionally
objectionable. Like consensual sodomy, fornication easily fits within this
unregulable core: Most states have decriminalized it, there is virtually no
evidence of third-party harms, and a whole generation (the baby boomers)
consider the right to fornicate important to their lives, or formative
experiences in their youths. Masturbation is an even easier call from
Scalia's list, 2 6 as it is not a crime anywhere in the United States, and it
does not harm anyone.
Conversely, laws criminalizing conduct that (1) is still a crime in a
large majority of states, (2) demonstrably harms third parties or the
community, and (3) has not become the focus of a social movement are
easy calls in the other direction-the state has substantial freedom to

268. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590, 599-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. !d. at 590 (Scalia's list included bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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criminalize. Most of the items on Scalia's list fall within this category of
permissible state regulation: adultery, which violates a promise of fidelity
and often imposes reliance and other costs on the innocent spouse; public
prostitution, which remains universally regulated and is associated with
nuisances of various sorts; child pornography, which is universally
regulated and has properly been upheld on the ground that participation in
it harms children; and incest involving minors, which is universally
regulated and has not become the focus of a social movement. 70 Since
1900, most morals regulations have been laws protecting children against
a variety of sexual knowledges and experiences.27 ' One may debate the
wisdom of this wide array of laws, and many of them have proven
vulnerable under the First Amendment, but neither Lawrence nor the
jurisprudence of tolerance poses any constitutional threat to them.
As Brett McDonnell has argued, the hardest calls are some of the adult
incest cases, including sex between first cousins and siblings by affinity
(marriage) rather than blood.2 72 Although adult incest between siblings is
criminal almost everywhere, many states do not include siblings by
affinity, and most do not make it a crime for first cousins to have sex.27 3 If
the reported cases are any guide, these statutes are almost never enforced
in cases involving consensual intercourse. 4 The harm of adult incest
seems speculative but plausible: If close relatives (cousins) or people
raised together (siblings by affinity) could engage in sex once they became
adults, the family as a sexually "safe" place would be undermined. On the
other hand, there are none of the collateral consequences for adult
incestophiles that Lawrencefound troubling for homosexual sodomy laws.
And, no social movement has formed to persuade America that adult incest
is okay. In large part because the social and normative stakes of adult
incest among cousins or siblings by affinity are so low, Lawrence and its
(or my) jurisprudence of tolerance do not clearly require that even these
statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
A constitutional right to same-sex marriage is supported by the equality
principle, for lesbian and gay couples will not be fully equal citizens until
they have the same choices for state recognition of their relationships that

270. On the continuing widespread regulation ofadultery, prostitution, child pornography, and
child incest, see RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX
LAWS (1996).

271. See ESKRLDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 175, app. A3, at 342-51.
272. See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 350 (2004)

(post-Lawrence analysis); see also Margaret M. Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily:
The Example ofIncest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21 (1993); Christine McNiece Metteer, Some
"Incest " Is Harmless Incest: Determining the FundamentalRight to Marry of Adults Related by
Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 262 (2000).

273. See McDonnell, supranote 272, at 349-50.
274. See
Metteer,
supra note 272.
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straight couples have. But the state's limitation of marriage to different-sex
couples does not much implicate the liberty principle. The legality
principle cuts strongly against same-sex marriage at this time: Not only
have the states traditionally not recognized same-sex unions as marriage,
but only one state (Massachusetts) does today.275 So the case for same-sex
marriage as a constitutional matter is powerfully debatable. Under such
circumstances, the Supreme Court has the discretion to engage in at least
a moderately active judicial review or to do nothing. The politics of
tolerance strongly counsels that the Court do nothing for the time being.
Either rejecting or endorsing the constitutionality of same-sex marriage
bars would immediately raise the stakes of national politics. The reason is
that the issue of same-sex marriage not only remains divisive, but also
divides in ways that cut to the core of people's identities. Under these
circumstances, the Court's best strategy is to leave the matter to the states,
'
Indeed, this is the
the famous "laboratories for experimentation."276
strategy the Court took, with success, in the right to die case, Washington
v. Glucksberg.277 Although the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court
rejected any constitutional right to die, five Justices took the position that
the matter was not ripe for complete resolution and pronounced themselves
open to future claims.278 Meanwhile, the states are free to recognize a right
to die, and the experience from those states (and from abroad) will provide
valuable information for other states and for the courts in future cases.
On the other hand, most of the state and local discriminations explicitly
targeting lesbian and gay citizens ought to be suspect after Romer and
Lawrence. A controversial example brings us back to Dade County and
Florida-the 1977 Florida law which broadly prohibits lesbians, gay men,
and bisexuals from adopting children. 27 9 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the
law in Lofion v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services.28 ° Consistent with Romer, Judge Birch's opinion appropriately
declined to attribute a morality-based justification for the statutory
discrimination and instead defended it as a reasonable signal by the state
that it considers husband-wife households to be the best situses for rearing

275. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (abrogating state
discrimination against same-sex couples and requiring the state to issue marriage licenses).
276. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995).
277. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
278. Five Justices were open to a "constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the
circumstances of his or her imminent death," but they felt that it was premature to decide one way
or another in 1997. Id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 738-52 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgments); id. at 752-89 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgments); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgments); id. at 789-92 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
279. 1977 Fla. Laws ch.77-140, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2003)).
280. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11 th Cir. 2004), en
banc reh 'g denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir. 2004).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
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children. The anti-homosexual rule was, according to Judge Birch,
"designed to create adoptive homes that resemble the nuclear family as
' He accepted the state's position that "disallowing
closely as possible."281
adoption into homosexual households, which are necessarily motherless
or fatherless and lack the stability that comes with marriage, is a rational
means of furthering Florida's interest in promoting adoption by marital
families."282
Dissenting from denial of a petition for the whole circuit to hear the
case, Judge Barkett argued that the Florida law is awfully similar to the
Colorado initiative struck down in Romer.283 Like Colorado's Amendment
2, Florida's law was innovative anti-gay discrimination, the first of its kind
in the United States; even today, no state singles out lesbians and gay men,
and them alone, as a class unfit to adopt children.284 Additionally, the
discriminatory classification is greatly under-inclusive, for it allows
unmarried heterosexuals to adopt. If the state goal were, genuinely, to
encourage adoption within marital households, one would expect the state
either to bar adoption by single people or, at least, to create a presumption
favoring adoption by married people. Florida does neither. 285 Moreover, the
state rule allows heterosexual child molesters, wife-beaters, and drug
addicts to adopt children, even though they pose great risks to children's
welfare.286 And Florida's discrimination, like that of Colorado's
Amendment 2, is woefully over-inclusive. Many gay and lesbian
households are among the best situses for childrearing, even under the
state's rationale. As Judge Birch generously explained, Stephen Lofton and
Douglas Houghton, the gay men who brought the challenge, are near-saints
whose "courage, tenacity and devotion" to the children under their care as
foster parents are an example every parent-straight as well as gay--can
appreciate and applaud.287
281. Id. at 818.
282. Id. at 818-19.
283. Lofion, 377 F.3d at 1290-313 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc).
284. Id. In 2000, Mississippi barred adoptions by "couples of the same gender." MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2004). In 1999, Arkansas adopted an administrative rule barring homosexuals
from becoming foster parents, but not from adopting. 22 Ark. Reg. 22 (May 1999), invalidatedby
Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL 3154530 (Ark. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (referring to the rule as Regulation 200.3.2). Between 1987 and 1999, New
Hampshire followed Florida in barring homosexuals from adopting children, see 1987 N.H. Laws
ch. 343 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1987)), but the statute was
amended in 1999 to allow homosexuals to adopt, see 1999 N.H. Laws ch. 18 (codified at N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN § 170-B:4 (1999)) (amending the 1987 version of the statute).
285. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1290, 1297 & n.14, 1298 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
286. Id. at 1290; see FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (2005).
287. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1290 (Birch, J., specially concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc) (upholding the Florida Legislature's statute although finding it "misguided").
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At bottom, Florida's rationale sounded a lot like the one the Supreme
Court attributed to Colorado: excluding homosexuals simply because the
majority doesn't like them. Florida's response would be that, "No, we're
excluding them because they are not married!" But this is circular, for
Lofton and his partner (Roger Croteau) would get married if the state
would let them. Florida's we-prefer-married-couples argument is a
lavender herring.288 Ultimately, Florida's position is that "dual-gender
parenting" is important for shaping a child's "sexual and gender identity
' But under that rationale,
and in providing heterosexual role modeling."289
it is just as bad for single heterosexuals as for single homosexuals to adopt.
Indeed, in Dade County, where Lofton and Croteau were living and raising
their five foster children, forty percent of the adoptions from foster care are
to single people.29 °
Moreover, the Florida statute had a feature the Romer Court did not
know Amendment 2 had: open appeal to anti-gay animus. Justice Kennedy
inferred animus from Amendment 2's over- and under-inclusion, but Judge
Barkett found the animus right in the legislative history-a history that
followed the aggressively anti-gay script Anita Bryant had written in Dade
County. 2 1 Senator Curtis Peterson introduced the anti-gay adoption
proposal in the legislature during the Save Our Children campaign. At the
Senate committee hearing on the bill, supporters referred to the campaign
as one that had galvanized constituent interest in protecting children from
homosexuals.292 At the House committee hearing on May 19, 1977, the
sponsor said that "'the majority of the committee supports Ms. Bryant and
her move to do what she is doing. '293 When the bill was passed by the
Senate on May 3 1, Senator Peterson stated its message to homosexuals:
"'We're really tired of you. We wish you would go back into the
closet.' 294 Echoing precisely the Save Our Children Constitutionalism,
Senator Peterson continued: "'The problem in Florida is that homosexuals
are surfacing to such an extent that they're beginning to aggravate the
ordinary folks, who have a few rights of their own.' 295 Governor Askew,

288. Indeed, Lofton and Croteau, now living in Oregon, did get married in 2004, when
Multnomah County (Portland) issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Telephone Interview
with Steven Lofton (May 18, 2005).
289. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818 (panel opinion).
290. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1297 n.14 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc).
291. Id. at 1301-02.
292. Id. at 1302-03.
293. See id. at 1302 n.31 (surveying the legislative history and quoting from the tape-recorded
proceedings of the House Judiciary Committee on May 19, 1977).
294. Id. at 1303 (quoting Senator Peterson as reported in Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers,FLA.
TIMES UNION, June 1, 1977).
295. Id. at 1303 n.36 (quoting Senator Peterson as reported in Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers,
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who had endorsed Bryant's politics of disgust and contagion, signed the
bill into law on June 8, the day after Dade County revoked its
antidiscrimination ordinance.296
Like Judge Barkett and unlike Judge Birch, I believe the actual
legislative history of the Florida adoption law is relevant. Not only does it
help explain why the statute is so enormously under- and over-inclusive,
but it also identifies the purpose of the statute: to drive homosexuals back
into the closet, and perhaps out of the state. This is a classic stakes-raising
rationale, one that alienates a minority from ordinary politics and fuels
violence as well as hatred among the majority. And it is a stakes-raising
rationale that is deeply inconsistent with the legality and equality principles
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Picking on homosexuals as enemies of
family values violates both neutrality and inclusion norms of the
Constitution of Tolerance.
The Supreme Court denied review in Lofton, 97 probably to allow the
country to simmer down after Lawrence and the advent of same-sex
marriage the next year in Massachusetts.298 Although the Florida adoption
statute is precisely the kind of discriminatory law that should fall under the
Constitution of Tolerance, the judges who either sustained the law or
ducked the case were not behaving irrationally. The body politics
classically embodied in Save Our Children is one that has not died in
America, and it is a politics that could be turned against the judiciary. If
ordinary Americans believed the Supreme Court were promoting
disgusting behavior and opening the country to sexual contagion, as Justice
Scalia charged in his Romer and Lawrencedissents, the Court's legitimacy
would suffer, however rigorous its reasoning or just its judgments. This is
why the Court will not-and ought not-require the states to recognize
same-sex marriage issue anytime soon. But the Florida adoption law
remains a lonely remnant of Anita Bryant's anti-homosexual crusade, and
striking it down would not put federal judges at risk in the same way samesex marriage would. If the Eleventh Circuit was not crazy in declining to
review the law en banc, neither was it wise. Given our current
understanding of family and childrearing, the Eleventh Circuit should have
followed Judge Barkett.

FLA. TIMES UNION,

June

1, 1977).

296. Id. at 1303.
297. 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
298. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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VI. CONCLUSION: BODY POLITICS AS A POWERFULLY
DANGEROUS DISCOURSE

The body politics and its disgust-based constitutionalism I have sought
to recapture in this article has a rich history in our country. It not only helps
us understand the anti-homosexual laws a!d regulatory practices created,
and often sustained, in the twentieth century, but also helps us understand
why race-based apartheid, state sterilization and castration schemes, and
even the anti-Mormon Kulturkampf of the nineteenth century flourished
and were constitutionally acceptable for most of the nation's history.299
While sterilization is long gone, and apartheid no longer acceptable, this
body politics is not only still viable, but perhaps as viable as it has ever
been. Traditional family values groups no longer favor putting
homosexuals in jail, but same-sex marriage has provided them with a new
situs for a kinder, gentler body politics. Gone are Anita Bryant's
declaration that homosexuals are disgusting beasts, but still with us are
open depictions of homosexuals as diseased (because they do disgusting
things). Gone is the charge that homosexuals are child molesters, replaced
by the charge that they threaten the family and other cherished institutions
by their mere presence. Disgust and contagion are still the hallmarks of
anti-gay discourse, but the discourse has genuinely changed in response to
Romer and the cultural shift that created the conditions for Romer.
Body politics is also a powerful way to understand the abortion wars in
the United States. The politics of abortion involves uniquely high stakes,
because each side can intelligently understand abortion as a gruesome body
politics. Pro-choice Americans understand compulsory pregnancy and
childbearing as state commandeering or colonization of women's bodies.300
Even more disgusting to them are the stories of bodily mutilation from
earlier eras or even today (in some places), where young women did or do
not have access to abortions. 30 1 Pro-life Americans understand abortion
choice as destruction of a human body. Texas's brief in Roe v. Wade
32
included ten photographs of fetuses with discernible child-like features.
Texas dared the Justices to allow murder of these obvious human beings.
Today, lurid descriptions of partial-birth abortions (graphically sounding
in murder and torture language) supplement these pictures.30 3 These photos
and descriptions inspire disgust and revulsion even among many who
299. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
300. Brief of Appellants at 94-115, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18); Brief on
Behalf ofPlaintiff-in-Error at 33-39, Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 537 (1919) (No. 75) (applying
similar body politics in the pioneer contraception brief).
301.

See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).

302. See Brief for Appellee, figs. 1-10, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18).
303. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 983-87 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (providing a
detailed description of partial-birth abortion, a procedure likened to "infanticide").
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support a woman's right to choose abortions. For both groups, the politics
of disgust serves to unite as well as divide: A pro-life identity entails
feeling the same revulsion at abortion that others feel; to a lesser extent, a
pro-choice identity entailed feeling the same revulsion at backroom
butcheries that prevailed before Roe and still exist all over the country.
And the politics of disgust renders each group's stance intensely held and
relatively intractable.
Perhaps most interesting is how a body politics of disgust and
contagion are showing up in new situses. Although technically prohibited
by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)," 4 discrimination against
people with AIDS (PWAs) remains pervasive. PWAs are the new
embodiment of the disgusting, contagious American. Many people
incorrectly assume that the PWA comes by his or her infection because of
disgusting conduct (sodomy, drug use) and that he or she is contagious.
Even though the ADA's legislative history could not have been clearer, the
Supreme Court (in another courageous opinion by Justice Kennedy) only
narrowly ruled (five votes to four) that PWAs are disabled and therefore
protected under the ADA.3 °5
Body politics helps us understand the long and vicious history of
discrimination suffered by people with physical and mental disabilities in
the United States. Few people realize how pervasively state and local
governments stigmatized, excluded, sterilized, and persecuted people with
disabilities throughout the twentieth century. For example, until 1974
Chicago made it a crime for persons to appear in public who are "diseased,
maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be an unsightly or
disgusting object."30 6 The same kind of body politics was involved: These
people look disgusting, and their presence threatens the integrity of the
body politick. The persistence of these feelings may help explain why
federal judges, including most of the Supreme Court, have applied the
ADA much more reluctantly than they have applied any other civil rights
statute in living memory. Some of the doctrines judges have devised are
direct testimony to this effect. Employers have had great success in
defending their exclusion of people with mental disabilities on the ground
that their disabilities are, literally, contagious.30 7

304. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
305. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998).
306. Marcia Pearce Burgdorf& Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualificationsof HandicappedPersonsas a "Suspect Class " under the Equal ProtectionClause,
15 SANTA CLARA L. REVIEW 855, 863 (1975) (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 36-34 (1966)

(repealed 1974)).
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The most obvious, and least predictable, ramifications of a body
politics of disgust and contagion is the new war on terrorism. The threat of
terrorism is real and serious-as are the risks of policies that target
Americans based on their race, ethnicity, or religion.3"' What must be
avoided is a politics that renders Arab bodies corrupt, demonizes Muslim
gods, and exploits racist fears of ethnic contagion. The judiciary plays a
marginal role in the war on terrorism, but it makes constructive
contributions in reducing its temperature through reassuring minorities that
the Constitution applies to them," 9 their mistreatment carries with it
judicial remedies (through habeas corpus, for example),"' and statutes will
not be aggressively construed to enable their segregation and forced
detention.3 11

308. E.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002).
309. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
310. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
311. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting in part); id. at 2671-72 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/1
54

